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An architectural principle known as protocol layering is widely recognized as 
one of the foundations of the Internet’s success. In addition, some scholars and 
industry participants have urged using the layers model as a central organizing 
principle for regulatory policy. Despite its importance as a concept, a comprehensive 
analysis of protocol layering and its implications for Internet policy has yet to appear 
in the literature. This Article attempts to correct this omission. It begins with a 
detailed description of the way the five-layer model developed, introducing protocol 
layering’s central features, such as the division of functions across layers, infor-
mation hiding, peer communication, and encapsulation. It then discusses the 
model’s implications for whether particular functions are performed at the edge or in 
the core of the network, contrasts the model with the way that layering has been 
depicted in the legal commentary, and analyzes attempts to use layering as a basis 
for competition policy. Next the Article identifies certain emerging features of the 
Internet that are placing pressure on the layered model, including WiFi routers, 
network-based security, modern routing protocols, and wireless broadband. These 
developments illustrate how every architecture inevitably limits functionality as 
well as the architecture’s ability to evolve over time in response to changes in the 
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technological and economic environment. Together these considerations support 
adopting a more dynamic perspective on layering and caution against using layers 
as a basis for a regulatory mandate for fear of cementing the existing technology into 
place in a way that prevents the network from innovating and evolving in response 
to shifts in the underlying technology and consumer demand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most striking developments of the past two decades is the 
emergence of the Internet both as the dominant medium of communication 
and as a dynamic engine of innovation. Policymakers and commentators 
typically attribute the Internet’s success to key architectural principles 
incorporated into its design.1 Among the most frequently cited of these 
principles is a concept known as protocol layering,2 which was first devel-
oped for the International Standards Organization’s (ISO) Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) Reference model during the late 1970s.3 Layering has 
become so widely accepted that it now represents the central framework 
around which most textbooks on network engineering are organized.4 
 
1 See, e.g., Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 
17909 para. 11 (2010) (report and order) [hereinafter Open Internet Order] (calling aspects of the 
Internet’s architecture “critical to its unparalleled success”); Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 109th Cong. 54 (2006) (prepared statement of Lawrence 
Lessig, C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law, Stanford Law School) (“[T]he 
innovation and explosive growth of the Internet [has been] directly linked to its particular 
architectural design.”); id. at 9 (prepared statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice Pres. & Chief 
Internet Evangelist, Google Inc.) (“The remarkable success of the Internet can be traced to a few 
simple network principles—end-to-end design, layered architecture, and open standards . . . .”). 
2 See, e.g., HAL ABELSON ET AL., BLOWN TO BITS 312-13 (2008) (arguing that technological 
convergence means that “laws and regulations should respect layers” rather than treating each 
medium, such as telephony, cable, and radio, as its own silo); COMM. ON THE INTERNET IN THE 
EVOLVING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE INTERNET’S 
COMING OF AGE 4, 36-38 (2001) (discussing the importance of the “hourglass” structure of the 
Internet, where innovation occurs “at the edge of the network”). The other principal architectural 
feature is known as the end-to-end argument. I have offered my initial thoughts on this principle 
elsewhere. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or 
Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
23 (2004). I plan to offer a more detailed analysis in my future work. 
3 On the OSI Reference Model’s adherence to layering, see Meeting of Int’l Org. of Standards 
Technical Comm., ISO/TC 97/SC 16 N34, Provisional Model of Open-Systems Architecture 
(1978), reprinted in COMPUTER COMM. REV., July 1978, at 49, 49-56; and Hubert Zimmermann, 
OSI Reference Model—The ISO Model of Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection, 28 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 425, 426-27, 429-30 (1980). On the connections between layering in 
the OSI Reference Model and the Internet model, see M.A. Padlipsky, A Perspective on the 
ARPANET Reference Model 4, 8 (Internet Eng’g Task Force (IETF) Network Working Grp. 
Request for Comments (RFC) No. 871, 1982) [hereinafter RFC 871], available at http://tools. 
ietf.org/pdf/rfc871. 
4 See, e.g., 1 DOUGLAS E. COMER, INTERNETWORKING WITH TCP/IP 161-63 (5th ed. 
2006); JAMES F. KUROSE & KEITH W. ROSS, COMPUTER NETWORKING: A TOP-DOWN 
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Indeed, belief in the layered model has become so strong that it is often 
widely regarded as the “proper” way to modularize a network.5  
There is widespread agreement that the incorporation of protocol layer-
ing into the Internet’s architecture has yielded substantial benefits. Layer-
ing allows those working on one layer to ignore most of the inner workings 
of the other layers, which reduces coordination costs and accelerates product 
development times by permitting parallel testing and innovation. Layered 
architectures also provide a stable configuration of network resources and 
interfaces around which actors can focus their efforts. The current architec-
ture has also proven incredibly resilient. Despite originally being designed 
for a much smaller scale and a more limited technological and economic 
context, the Internet now integrates a larger number and greater variety of 
uses and technologies than its designers ever imagined.6  
Protocol layering has also found its way into discussions of Internet 
policy.7 Early commentators offered it as a technologically agnostic alter-
native to the regime established by the Communications Act of 1934,8 which 
subjected communications to distinct regulatory regimes based on whether 
 
APPROACH 48-56 (5th ed. 2010); ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS (4th ed. 
2003). Even textbooks organized along different lines still mention protocol layering prominently. 
See, e.g., LARRY L. PETERSON & BRUCE S. DAVIE, COMPUTER NETWORKS: A SYSTEMS 
APPROACH 19-30 (4th ed. 2007). 
5 See David Clark, Foreword to the First Edition of PETERSON & DAVIE, supra note 4, at ix, ix 
(“All good computer scientists worship the god of modularity . . . . The field of network 
protocols is perhaps unique in that the ‘proper’ modularity has been handed down to us in the 
form of an international standard: the seven-layer reference model of network protocols from the 
ISO.”); David D. Clark, Modularity and Efficiency in Protocol Implementation 24 (IETF Network 
Working Grp. RFC No. 817, 1982) [hereinafter RFC 817], available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/ 
rfc817 (noting the “tempt[ation] to think that a layer boundary . . . is in fact the proper boundary 
to use in modularizing the implementation”). 
6 See STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 713-21 
(3d ed. 2012). 
7 For leading discussions of layering in the legal literature, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 23-25 (2001); 
BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 46-57, 83-105 (2010); 
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 67-69 (2008); 
Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 823-849 (2004); Adam Thierer, Are “Dumb Pipe” Mandates Smart 
Policy? Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 275, 279-83 (2005); Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 57-64 (2002); Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: 
Formulating a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 
FED. COMM. L.J. 587, 601-09, 614-36 (2004); and Timothy Wu, Essay, Application-Centered 
Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1164, 1189-92 (1999). 
8 Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in 47 U.S.C.). 
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they were transmitted over telephone wires, coaxial cables, or spectrum.9 
Others argued that the layered model remained properly agnostic about the 
content of the rules, but argued that problematic practices arising in one 
layer be addressed only through regulations directly targeted at that layer—
rather than through regulations designed to curb that behavior by targeting 
another layer or the system as a whole.10  
Other analyses have drawn stronger policy inferences from the layered 
model. For example, some commentators argued that the layered model 
could support competition policy by providing “natural boundaries” for 
defining markets,11 noting that each layer is subject to different sources of 
market power.12 Others went further, suggesting that the economics of the 
lower layers made them particularly susceptible to market power, although 
they acknowledged the possibility of deregulating the lower layers once 
they became more competitive.13 Others argued that layering promotes “fair 
 
9 See Douglas C. Sicker & Joshua L. Mindel, Refinements of a Layered Model for Telecommuni-
cations Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69, 72 (2002) (explaining the “existing 
policy” of regulating different services under different titles of the Communications Act); 
Werbach, supra note 7, at 64-65 (discussing how the distinct regulation of telephone and cable led 
to inconsistent treatment between similar technologies, such as DSL and cable modem services); 
Whitt, supra note 7, at 615-17 (surveying critiques of the current silo approach that uses the 
underlying technology as the basis for regulation rather than concepts of layering). 
10 See Solum & Chung, supra note 7, at 849, 853 (defining the “layers principle” as the need 
to “respect the integrity of the layers” and advocating “minimization of layer-crossing regula-
tion”); Douglas C. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy 13 
(Oct. 3, 2002) (paper presented at the 30th Telecomms. Policy Research Conf.), available at http:// 
www.learningace.com/doc/1675669/875a17ec13593859fdd613067974f72b/tprc_layered_model 
(“[P]olicy issues at one layer should be recognized as different from policy issues at another 
layer.”). 
11 Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 
55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 195 (2003). 
12 See Robert M. Entman, Transition to an IP Environment (“Higher degrees of competition 
may be more feasible and desirable at some layers than others. Therefore, policymakers should 
recognize that a pro-competitive policy may need to treat different layers differently.”), in ASPEN 
INST., TRANSITION TO AN IP ENVIRONMENT: A REPORT OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL ASPEN 
INSTITUTE CONFERENCE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 1, 2-3 (2001), available at http:// 
www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/cands/TRANSITION_BK.PDF; Michael 
L. Katz, Thoughts on the Implications of Technological Change for Telecommunications Policy (noting 
that “the assessment of market power should largely take place at each layer separately” and 
discussing how the sources of market power at the transport layer differ from the sources of 
market power at the applications layer), in ASPEN INST., supra, at 25, 37-38. 
13 See, e.g., Werbach, supra note 7, at 66 (“If the physical and logical infrastructure layers in 
the relevant markets were sufficiently competitive, ILECs would not be able to gain unfair 
advantage over competitors at the application and content layers.”); Whitt, supra note 7, at 592, 
649, 653, 667 (“[W]hen applied in the telecommunications industry context, the Network Layers 
Model targets the lower network layers for discrete regulation based on the existence of significant 
market power, rather than legacy service or industry labels.”). 
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and open competition” among providers offering services at each layer.14 
Still others equated layering with innovation15 and advocated regulations 
mandating that the interfaces between layers remain open.16  
More recent analyses have relied on the existing layered architecture as 
the foundation for proposals to implement the Open Internet Order. For 
example, some commentators argue for using consistency with the existing 
layered architecture as the first screen for determining whether a traffic 
management practice is reasonable,17 a position endorsed by certain policy 
advocates.18 Others advocate a nondiscrimination rule that maps onto the 
layered architecture, arguing that lower layers should be forbidden from 
discriminating on the basis of any information contained in the upper layers.19  
The Internet’s success should not obscure, however, that every architec-
ture necessarily has limitations as well as strengths. David Clark, who was 
the chief protocol architect for the ARPANET during the 1980s, offered 
 
14 Ashish Shah et al., Thinking About Openness in the Telecommunications Policy Context 
13 (Sept. 1, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2060641. 
15 See Solum & Chung, supra note 7, at 816 (“The role of the Internet in enabling innovation 
is not accidental; rather it flows from the Internet’s [layered] architecture.”); Whitt, supra note 7, 
at 629 (noting “the strong correlation between robust, ends-oriented innovation and the architec-
ture of the Internet”); Wu, supra note 7, at 1192-93 (claiming that the layered architecture of the 
Internet supports “an astoundingly large set of possible applications”).  
16 Entman, supra note 12, at 16; see also Werbach, supra note 7, at 66-67 (analyzing conditions 
under which rules preventing the closure of interfaces between layers would be desirable). 
17 Scott Jordan, Four Questions that Determine Whether Traffic Management Is Reasonable, 2009 
IFIP/IEEE INT’L SYMP. ON INTEGRATED NETWORK MGMT. 137, 138 (2009); see also Scott 
Jordan & Arijit Ghosh, A Framework for Classification of Traffic Management Practices as Reasonable 
or Unreasonable, 10 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 12:1, 12:7 (2010) (proposing an 
initial screening test for whether a traffic management technique is applied at the right location for 
the layer). 
18 See Comments of Google Inc. 25-26, 69-70 ( Jan. 14, 2010), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc. 
gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020378725 (arguing that “the physical layer provider is uniquely 
positioned to impede, hinder or deter consumer access to other applications providers,” whereas 
“[a]pplications layer providers obviously do not have a comparable ability,” and that “[t]his stark 
functional difference warrants government scrutiny of lower layer activities” and endorsing 
Jordan’s proposal that “[n]etwork congestion techniques also should be consistent with Internet 
layers architecture”), commenting on Preserving the Open Internet, 24 FCC Rcd. 13064, GN 
Docket No. 09-191 (2009) (notice of proposed rulemaking); Reply Comments of Ctr. for 
Democracy & Tech. 18-19 (2010), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id= 
7020437353 (supporting traffic-management practices where they focus on transmission and do not 
affect caching and paid peering), commenting on Preserving the Open Internet, supra.  
19 Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a Non-
Discrimination Rule Should Look Like 54 box 18 (Stanford Law Sch. Ctr. for Internet and Soc’y, 
unnumbered working paper, 2012), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/publication/files/ 
20120611-NetworkNeutrality_0.pdf. The layering principle prohibits network operators from 
either accessing or acting on information contained in higher-level protocols. Under van 
Schewick’s proposal, network providers can access and analyze this information, but cannot act on 
it. Id. In other words, they can look, but they cannot touch.  
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some observations about implicit tradeoffs in layering that, despite being 
made with respect to an earlier architecture and concerns that did not fully 
mature, still reflect some basic insights. Clark recognized that the centrality 
of layering in the engineering literature “tends to suggest that layering is a 
fundamentally wonderful idea which should be a part of every consideration 
of protocols.”20 Such a perspective overlooks the fact that layering provides 
“both a benefit and a penalty.”21 While “[a] visible layer boundary, with a 
well specified interface, provides a form of isolation between two layers” 
that permits modifications to one layer without interfering with other 
layers, “a firm layer boundary almost inevitably leads to inefficient oper-
ation.”22 Hiding much of the technical complexity behind layer boundaries 
prevents other layers from taking advantage of the full functionality of the 
underlying technology, which in turn increases the resources needed to 
perform the desired task.23 Thus, the “tempt[ation] to think that a layer 
boundary . . . is in fact the proper boundary to use in modularizing the 
implementation” is “a potential snare.”24 The tradeoff between generality 
and efficiency is “rarely acknowledged in the computing literature,” how-
ever.25 A small but important body of work exists in the engineering 
literature exploring how protocol layering can harm network performance.26  
 
20 RFC 817, supra note 5, at 24. 
21 Id. at 16. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 17. Clark continues: 
In fact, layering is a mixed blessing. Clearly, a layer interface is necessary whenever 
more than one client of a particular layer is to be allowed to use that same layer. But 
an interface, precisely because it is fixed, inevitably leads to a lack of complete un-
derstanding as to what one layer wishes to obtain from another. This has to lead to 
inefficiency.  
Id. at 24. 
24 Id.; see also COMER, supra note 4, at 169 (observing that “strict layering can be extremely 
inefficient” by sometimes preventing a layer “from optimizing transfers”); RFC 871, supra note 3, 
at 11 (listing efficiency concerns arising from layering). 
25 Jean-François Blanchette, A Material History of Bits, 62 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & 
TECH. 1042, 1047 (2011). 
26 For classic analyses of the potential downsides of protocol layering, see Greg Chesson, 
Protocol Engine Design, 1987 PROC. USENIX SUMMER CONF. 209; Jon Crowcroft et al., Is 
Layering Harmful?, IEEE NETWORK, Jan. 1992, at 20, 23-24; David Tennenhouse, Layered 
Multiplexing Considered Harmful, in PROTOCOLS FOR HIGH-SPEED NETWORKS 143, 144-45 (H. 
Rudin & R. Williamson eds., 1989); David D. Clark & David L. Tennenhouse, Architectural 
Considerations for a New Generation of Protocols, COMPUTER COMM. REV., Sept. 1990, at 200, 205-
07; and Randy Bush & David Meyer, Some Internet Architectural Guidelines and Philosophy 7-12 
(IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 3439, 2002) [hereinafter RFC 3439], available at http:// 
tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc3439. 
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In addition to its impact on efficiency, protocol layering can also have an 
adverse impact on innovation that is often overlooked. Although protocol 
layering promotes innovations that are consistent with the architecture, at 
the same time it impedes innovations that are inconsistent with the design 
hierarchy.27 Moreover, any changes that require a reconfiguration of the 
design hierarchy require coordinating with actors operating at the layers 
both above and below the locus of the innovation, which makes such 
innovations all the more difficult to implement. 
The existing policy debate based on protocol layering largely ignores the 
extent to which it is something of a mixed blessing from the standpoint of 
innovation. On the one hand, to yield any benefits, an architecture must be 
relatively stable and change only rarely.28 Indeed, the natural temptation for 
computer scientists to optimize for particular applications29 or to redesign 
the entire system from scratch means that any calls for a fundamental 
redesign of the entire architecture should be greeted with a healthy amount 
of skepticism.30  
On the other hand, to say architectural changes should be infrequent is 
not to say that they should never occur. Even the strongest proponents of 
the layered model recognize that the architecture can and should evolve 
over time.31 Major changes transforming the Internet environment—
including the growing heterogeneity of end users, the advent of Internet-
based video and cloud computing, and the emergence of wireless broadband 
and the smartphone operating system as the relevant platforms—raise the 
possibility that circumstances may have changed sufficiently to justify a 
change in the architecture.32 Indeed, the emergence of wireless broadband 
as an important medium of transmission has spawned a growing literature 
on cross-layer design exploring new architectures that deviate from the 
 
27 See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
28 See Blanchette, supra note 25, at 1054. 
29 D.L. Parnas, Information Distribution Aspects of Design Methodology, 1 INFO. PROCESSING 71: 
PROC. IFIP CONG. 71, at 339, 342 (1972). 
30 See Blanchette, supra note 25, at 1055 (noting that developers “often fantasize” about a 
“clean slate” but that effective “infrastructural change proceeds just as much through improvisa-
tion, bricolage, and drift”). 
31 See Solum & Chung, supra note 7, at 865 (“As the Internet evolves, it is possible that supe-
rior architectures may be conceived.”); Werbach, supra note 7, at 66 (“If the physical and logical 
infrastructure layers in the relevant markets were sufficiently competitive, ILECs would not be 
able to gain unfair advantage over competitors at the application and content layers.”); Whitt, 
supra note 7, at 619 (“At its core, the layers principle is a pragmatic tool . . . [and] policymakers 
should take care not to enshrine it as either definitive or dispositive in each and every situation.”). 
32 See CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET 4 (2012) (“The dramatic shift in 
Internet usage suggests that its founding architectural principles . . . may no longer be appropriate 
today.”). 
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existing layered stack.33 While cross-layer design has many proponents, it 
has proven controversial, with many other engineers contending that it is an 
unnecessary deviation.34 
These technological developments are leading both the engineering 
community and policymakers to try to determine the optimal rate of 
architectural change and to develop analytical frameworks for recognizing 
the circumstances under which it should occur. This requires a better 
understanding of the tradeoffs implicit in protocol layering. Absent such an 
understanding, regulations that embody a particular vision of the architec-
ture risk effectively locking the existing implementation into place without 
taking into account the contingencies that may necessitate changes in the 
underlying architecture. Policymakers should understand the underlying 
tradeoffs and risks before enshrining any architecture into law, no matter 
how successful it has proven in the past. Without such an understanding, 
the invocation of engineering concepts can provide a veneer of technological 
legitimacy to what is more properly regarded as a normative claim.35 It also 
prevents the balancing of other considerations that may favor greater 
integration and coordination.36 
This Article seeks to fill that gap. Part I introduces the basic principles 
underlying protocol layering. Part II reviews the evolution of the layered 
architecture underlying the Internet. Part III critiques the conceptions of 
protocol layering in the legal literature, including attempts to invoke it as a 
guide to competition policy. Part IV identifies developments that are 
putting pressure on the current layered stack. The conclusion offers an 
assessment of layering’s affirmative implications, determining that, until 
policymakers understand the principles underlying layering, the invocation 
 
33 See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
34 See, e.g., Vikas Kawadia & P.R. Kumar, A Cautionary Perspective on Cross-Layer Design, 
IEEE WIRELESS COMM., Feb. 2005, at 3, 7-8 (providing examples of negative and unintended 
system performance consequences that could result from cross-layer design). 
35 See Marjory S. Blumenthal, End-to-End and Subsequent Paradigms, 2002 L. REV. M.S.U.-
D.C.L. 709, 710 (“Although the embrace of engineering principles . . . appears to impart a 
legitimacy to certain kinds of advocacy, that advocacy reaches beyond the engineering to the 
ideology long associated with the Internet.”). 
36 See COMM. ON THE INTERNET IN THE EVOLVING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 145-46 (considering the benefits of vertically integrated companies and possible 
coordination benefits from combining applications and content); Timothy F. Bresnahan & M. 
Trajtenberg, General Purpose Technologies: “Engines of Growth”?, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS 83, 94-96 
(1995) (showing how greater vertical coordination can help internalize positive externalities 
generated by general purpose technologies); David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: 
Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 288, 291-92 
(1986) (suggesting that innovation requires close coordination of “complementary assets” to protect 
against inequalities in bargaining power and to encourage relationship-specific investments). 
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of engineering principles will obscure rather than promote sound policy 
analysis. 
I. THE CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS  
OF PROTOCOL LAYERING 
As described above, understanding the relative merits of a layered archi-
tecture as well as the circumstances under which it can and should change 
requires understanding the theory underlying the principle. Because 
layering is widely recognized as a particular form of modularity,37 Section A 
offers a basic introduction to modularity theory. Section B moves past 
modularity in general to discuss protocol layering in particular. Section C 
analyzes the advantages and disadvantages to layering suggested by the theory. 
To deal first with some preliminary matters of nomenclature, the com-
puters with which end users connect to the Internet are called hosts, and the 
various programs running on any particular host comprise a number of 
processes. Because the Internet is a network of networks, some of these 
computers are located within a network, while others serve as gateways 
between networks. Nodes that route traffic within a network are typically 
called switches, while nodes that route traffic between networks are called 
routers.38 
A particular convention for formatting, interpreting, and reacting to a 
communication is called a protocol.39 The functions of a protocol are well 
illustrated by the protocol used in the traditional postal system. Effective 
transmission of the mail requires agreement between those sending and 
carrying mail as to where to locate the relevant information. By convention, 
the return address for letters is located in the upper left-hand corner, the 
postage in the upper right-hand corner, and the destination address in the 
middle. The convention for postcards is somewhat different. For many 
postcards, the return address, the destination address, and the postage are 
all located on the right-hand side of the card. 
Mail systems must also agree on how to interpret the content of the in-
formation conveyed in these locations, such as the significance of particular 
ZIP codes, street addresses, and bar codes. Standardizing where important 
 
37 For discussions of layering as a unique form of modularity, see VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 
7, at 46, 379; Blanchette, supra note 25, at 1046; Crowcroft et al., supra note 26, at 23; RFC 871, 
supra note 3, at 7; Douglas C. Sicker & Lisa Blumensaadt, Misunderstanding the Layered Model(s), 4 
J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 299, 305 (2006); Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information 
Platforms, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 4 (2002); Werbach, supra note 7, at 59 n.85; 
Wu, supra note 7, at 1190. 
38 PETERSON & DAVIE, supra note 4, at 253. 
39 KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 4, at 9. 
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information is located greatly facilitates the mail system’s ability to process 
the mail while simultaneously flagging for the carrier what information may 
safely be ignored, such as the personal message written on the left-hand side 
of post cards. American conventions are by no means the only feasible 
formats. Indeed, many mail systems in Asia format addresses in the reverse 
order, with the state being listed first, followed by the city, and then the 
street address.40 Despite these differences, these systems will remain 
interoperable so long as each mail system is able to interpret and convert 
addresses in the other format. 
In addition, mail systems must share an understanding of how to handle 
particular situations. Some of these features control the tasks internal to one 
actor, such as how they should treat hold orders and change-of-address 
notices. The actors must also agree on what happens if the post office 
attempting to deliver a piece of mail cannot locate the destination address. 
For first-class mail, post offices return undeliverable mail to the location 
listed in the return address. For lower classes of mail, however, the post 
office simply discards the mail. 
Understanding how other actors are expected to behave under particular 
circumstances provides each actor with a guide to interpreting and reacting 
to what has happened. To use the example described above, if a piece of 
first-class mail is not returned to sender, the person sending it may assume 
that it was successfully delivered.41 The different treatment of lower classes 
of mail means that senders cannot infer anything from the fact that an 
article sent via a lower class was not returned. And at a far end of the 
spectrum, some classes of service require the post office to send a confirma-
tion of delivery back to the sender once mail is delivered, whereas most 
classes of mail do not. If the sender knows that the post office is supposed 
to send a delivery confirmation, it may regard the failure to receive a 
confirmation within a reasonable amount of time as an indication that the 
letter never arrived. Based on this inference, the sender can take whatever 
action it deems appropriate, whether that means resending the letter, 
choosing a different mode of communication, or abandoning attempts to 
convey the information altogether. 
 
40 Appendix V International Address Formats, MICROSOFT DEVELOPER NETWORK, http:// 
msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc195167.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2013). 
41 This inference is not conclusive, as it is always possible that the mail was lost or destroyed. 
Whether the sender should take additional means to verify delivery depends on the likelihood of 
an adverse event as well as the value of what was sent. 
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A. Modularity Theory 
Modularity is one of the principal mechanisms for managing complex 
systems.42 When the tasks constituting a system are highly interdependent, 
changes to one task will necessarily affect a wide range of other tasks. 
Anyone seeking to change one part of the system must then analyze the 
effect of that change on all of the other interdependent tasks. Modularity 
seeks to reduce the number of interdependencies that must be analyzed by 
identifying which tasks are highly interdependent and which ones are not. 
Highly interdependent tasks are grouped within modules.43 The points of 
relatively low interdependence become the natural locus for interfaces 
between modules.44  
Limiting the number of interdependencies between modules greatly 
simplifies the number of permutations that must be tested in order to verify 
that a change to one module is not adversely affecting the complex system.45 
Predefining the way in which different modules interact with one another 
also reduces coordination costs.46 Modular architectures ensure that other 
modules take into account only those interdependencies permitted by the 
design through a technique known as information hiding.47 Information 
needed to support the interdependencies with other modules contemplated 
by the architectural design must be included in the interface; information 
relating solely to interdependencies within the module is omitted from the 
interface and thus hidden from other modules.48 With respect to these 
hidden parameters, other blocks may regard this information as a “black 
box.”49 
 
42 The discussion that follows is based on the more comprehensive discussion of modularity 
theory in Christopher S. Yoo, Modularity and Internet Policy 5-12 (Sept. 23, 2012) (paper 
presented at the 40th Telecomms. Policy Research Conf.), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2032221.  
43 See id. at 8 (“A well designed module . . . is a unit whose structural elements are power-
fully connected among themselves and relatively weakly connected to elements in other units.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
44 Id. at 7. 
45 Id. at 8, 13 (citing Edsger W. Dijkstra, The Structure of the “THE”-Multiprogramming System, 
11 COMM. ACM 341, 343 (1968)). 
46 See id. at 14 (“[M]odularity facilitates the division of labor by enabling autonomous inno-
vation that requires little coordination among modules.” (citing Richard N. Langlois & Paul L. 
Robertson, Networks and Innovation in a Modular System: Lessons from the Microcomputer and Stereo 
Component Industries, 21 RES. POL’Y 297, 302 (1992))). 
47 Id. at 10 (citing Parnas, supra note 29, at 342). 
48 Id. at 11 (citing 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER 
OF MODULARITY 72-73 (2000)). 
49 Id. at 11 (quoting BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 48, at 91). 
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Consider, for example, the advent of printers using USB ports. Certain 
aspects of printer design are intimately tied to whether the printer is a laser 
or an inkjet printer. The creation of a modular interface allows computers 
connected to those printers to ignore almost all of the details about how any 
particular printer operates. As long as the computer provides the data in the 
correct format, the printer should operate without any problems. Conversely, 
as long as the printer remains ready to process any data submitted in the 
correct format, the printer’s design can be changed without having any 
impact on the overall system. 
Despite the design architect’s best efforts, modular systems can rarely be 
defined a priori. Many aspects of how tasks interact with one another can be 
understood only after the architect experiments with different solutions.50 
Consequently, modular systems more often result from “improvisation, 
bricolage, and drift” than from some theoretical conception of the ideal 
architecture.51  
B. Peer Communication and Encapsulation 
Layering represents a very particular form of modularity, in which 
different parts of the overall system are arranged into parallel hierarchies. In 
the typical Internet transaction, a process generates a message and transfers 
it to the operating system running on the host. The operating system 
divides the message into packets configured for the Internet and hands 
them off to the first-hop router of a communications network. The sending 
communications network will convey these packets to the receiving com-
munications network, which in turn passes them to the receiving host’s 
operating system. The operating system then passes them to the process 
running on the receiving host. 
The type of modularity enforced by layering has several distinct charac-
teristics. First, the modules are arranged into a series of client-server 
relationships, where “each layer is a server to the layer above, and a client to 
the layer below.”52 Second, this arrangement is strictly hierarchical; every 
 
50 See BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 48, at 254 (“Given such a high degree of complexity, it 
simply is not possible for designers to know enough about the system to eliminate all uncertainty. 
Thus each new design is fundamentally an experiment.”); Sendil K. Ethiraj & Daniel Levinthal, 
Modularity and Innovation in Complex Systems, 50 MGMT. SCI. 159, 172 (2004) (noting that 
designers “lack omniscience”). 
51 Blanchette, supra note 25, at 1055. 
52 Id. at 1046. 
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layer interacts exclusively with the layers above and below with respect to 
every communication without bypassing either.53  
Third, layering differs from other modular schemes in its focus on estab-
lishing communication between peers.54 Unlike the example of the USB 
port given above, in which a personal computer could establish a connection 
directly with a printer, layered architectures require that connections be 
established only between parallel elements in the hierarchy. For example, 
applications communicate with other applications; operating systems commu-
nicate with other operating systems; routers communicate with other routers. 
 
Figure 1: Layering as Peer Communication55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Layering ensures that peers communicate only with peers operating at 
the same level through a practice known as encapsulation. Under this ap-
proach, each layer takes the data packet provided by the layer above, 
extracts all of the information that the next layer will need to perform its 
functions, places that information into a new packet’s header, and then 
places the entirety of the packet it received from the higher layer in the 
payload of the new packet.56 Since layering requires that each layer examine 
only the information contained in the header and prohibits it from examining 
 
53 See RFC 871, supra note 3, at 9 (explaining that protocols operate in a hierarchy with a 
strict “chain of command”). 
54 See TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 26-30 (explaining how layering protocols facilitate 
communication between peers). 
55 See id. at 27 fig.1-13. 
56 KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 4, at 55-56. 
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or altering any of the information contained in the payload, the content of 
the packet remains hidden.57 
 
Figure 2: Layering as Encapsulation58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An analogy to the postal system is illustrative.59 Suppose that Vint 
wants to send a memo to a colleague named Bob, who is working in a 
different branch office of the same company. Vint takes the memo and 
places it in an interoffice envelope with Bob’s name and department written 
on the front. The company’s internal mail system brings the interoffice 
envelope to the mail room and, without opening it, places the entire 
contents inside a larger envelope, using the information on the outside of 
the interoffice envelope to inscribe the mailing address, formatted in the 
manner required by the U.S. Postal System, on the outside of the envelope. 
The mail room then gives the postal envelope to a U.S. Postal Service letter 
carrier who places it inside a shipping container with a bar code on its 
outside. After the shipping container arrives at a post office in the city 
where Bob’s branch office is located, the post office opens the shipping 
container, removes the postal envelope, reads the address on its outside, and 
delivers it to the branch office. The mail room of the branch office opens the 
postal envelope, reads the address on the interoffice envelope, and delivers 
it to Bob. Finally, Bob opens the interoffice envelope and reads the content 
 
57 See TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 448 (describing “the most fundamental rule of protocol 
layering: layer k may not make any assumptions about what layer k + 1 has put into the payload 
field”). 
58 For a similar figure showing an example of encapsulation of an IP datagram, see COMER, 
supra note 4, at 78. 
59 The example is adapted from TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 56. See also VAN SCHEWICK, 
supra note 7. 
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of the message from Vint—a message no one but the two of them had any 
occasion to see. 
Note the key features of this system. Each of the peers receives the exact 
same communication. After the memo is removed from the interoffice mail 
envelope, Bob receives the exact message sent by Vint. Once the U.S. mail 
envelope is opened, the receiving mail room receives precisely the same 
interoffice mail envelope and contents as the one sent by the sending mail 
room. After the shipping container is unpacked, the two post offices ex-
change precisely the same envelope containing the same message as well. 
The fact that each actor encapsulates the entirety of the communication in a 
larger envelope ensures that at each step the original message can be 
recovered unaltered. In addition, refusing to look inside the envelope until 
it is de-encapsulated ensures that lower-layer protocols cannot make any 
assumptions about objects handed to them by the upper-layer protocols.  
Using an example more closely related to the Internet, consider what 
occurs when an end user sends an email message. The end user’s email 
client, such as Microsoft Outlook, first extracts the source and destination 
addresses and places that information in the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
(SMTP) header, which is the general format used for email. Then the email 
client encapsulates the email in an SMTP message by placing the entire 
email in the payload of the packet and passes it to the next layer, the 
transport layer. The transport layer, in turn, reads the information it needs 
from the SMTP header and places that information in the Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) header, places the segment in the payload, and 
passes the segment to the network layer. The network layer reads the source 
and destination addresses from the TCP header, places the necessary 
information in the Internet Protocol (IP) header, encapsulates the segment 
into an IP datagram, and passes the datagram to the data-link layer. The 
data-link layer reads the information it needs from the IP header, places the 
relevant information in the frame header, and encapsulates the datagram 
into a data-link layer frame. The data-link layer will use the header infor-
mation to move the frame hop by hop.  
As long as each hop remains within both the same network and the same 
data-link technology, there is no need to de-encapsulate the frame to reveal 
information. But when the hop reaches a gateway to another network, the 
technology may change. Because moving to another network may involve 
shifting to a different data-link technology, the gateway de-encapsulates the 
data-link layer frame and passes it to the next network as an IP datagram. 
The next network will re-encapsulate it in a frame appropriate for its data-
link technology and will pass it along in this manner until it reaches the 
border of another network, when the de-encapsulation process begins again. 
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Eventually, the packet will reach the receiving host. The host will de-
encapsulate the data-link header and pass the IP datagram to the network 
layer. The network layer will remove the IP header and pass the segment to 
the transport layer. The transport layer will strip off the TCP header and 
pass the SMTP message to the application layer. Finally, the application 
layer will strip off the SMTP header and pass the email to the program that 
the receiving end user is using to read the message. 
Although it is the email clients that are exchanging messages, no direct 
transfers of data occur between them. Instead, each layer passes the data 
and control information down through the stack until it reaches the physical 
layer, which provides the only direct connection. After the communication 
arrives at the receiving host, the data passes up through the layered stack 
until it reaches the same layer as the peer sending the communication, at 
which point it can act on the same information. For this reason, all connec-
tions above the physical layer are simply virtual.60 
It is often said that layered architectures ensure that every entity in the 
receiving hierarchy receives the exact same object as the one sent by its peer 
in the sending hierarchy.61 As is the case with almost every generalized 
network engineering principle, there are important exceptions. To return to 
the postal example, one post office may use a postmark to cancel a stamp, in 
which case the object received will differ in a small way from the object 
sent. Similar changes occur in the email example. For example, intermediate 
mail transfer agents will include information in email messages noting that 
they were received. In addition, the IP header contains a counter that is 
reduced by one every time a packet traverses a hop, with routers ceasing to 
route a packet further when the counter hits zero to ensure that packets do 
not wander around the Internet forever. Nonetheless, the generalization 
remains a useful concept as a reference model. 
A related principle of layering is that lower layers can make no assump-
tions about the nature of the communications in the upper layers.62 Because 
all of the information that any particular layer needs is supposed to be 
included in the packet’s header, no layer is expected to look inside the 
payload of any packet that it processes. Any attempt to do so is regarded as 
 
60 TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 27, 30. 
61 See, e.g., COMER, supra note 4, at 164 (“Layered protocols are designed so that layer n at 
the destination receives exactly the same object sent by layer n at the source.”); id. at 165 (“Thus, 
the layering principle states that the packet received by the transport layer at the ultimate 
destination is identical to the packet sent by the transport layer at the original source.”). 
62 TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 448; RFC 871, supra note 3, at 16. 
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deep packet inspection.63 However, many widely deployed technologies 
represent exceptions to this general principle against deep packet 
inspection. 
C. The Tradeoffs Inherent in Protocol Layering 
Protocol layering yields a number of substantial benefits.64 Like other 
modular systems, layering breaks down complex systems into subparts small 
enough for a single person or a small group of people to describe and 
understand.65 In addition, by predetermining how each layer interacts with 
other layers, layering allows for the development of individual subparts in 
isolation without having to understand the architecture as a whole.66 Only 
those interactions recognized by the design need be taken into account; any 
details associated with interdependencies encapsulated within modules can 
be safely ignored.67 Even more importantly, cabining the number of 
possible interdependencies between modules reduces the combinatorial 
explosion of system variants that must be tested when changes are made to 
the system.68 
Segregating different functions and defining how they interact with one 
another also permit development of each layer to proceed independently 
and limit the impact that changes to individual components have on the 
system as a whole.69 Eliminating the need for direct coordination facilitates 
the division of labor across workgroups70 and firms.71 Furthermore, it pro-
motes competition by creating entry points for new firms.72 
 
63 Under a strict layering principle, each layer is allowed to invoke the services only of the 
layer located immediately below it. More relaxed versions permit a layer to invoke the services of 
any layer below it even if it is not immediately adjacent to it. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 7, at 47. 
64 This discussion is based on Yoo, supra note 42, at 12-17. 
65 See Blanchette, supra note 25, at 1046; Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 
106 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 467, 474, 477 (1962). 
66 See D.L. Parnas et al., The Modular Structure of Complex Systems, PROC. 7TH INT’L CONF. 
ON SOFTWARE ENG’G 408, 410 (1984). 
67 See BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 48, at 91 (noting that modularity “accommodates 
uncertainty” in the design process). 
68 Id. at 273-75; see also Dijkstra, supra note 45, at 344 (concluding that a hierarchical structure 
prevented the number of potential states from “explod[ing] to such a height that exhaustive 
testing would have been an illusion”). 
69 D.L. Parnas, On the Criteria to Be Used in Decomposing Systems into Modules, 15 COMM. 
ACM 1053, 1054 (1972); Simon, supra note 65, at 477. 
70 See Parnas, supra note 69, at 1054 (“[D]evelopment time should be shortened because 
separate groups would work on each module with little need for communication . . . .”); 
Langlois & Robertson, supra note 46, at 301-02 (discussing the benefits of division of labor into 
different groups). 
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Layering can also hasten innovation by allowing experiments with 
different solutions in different layers to proceed in parallel.73 In addition, 
protocol layering accommodates uncertainty by making it easy to incorpo-
rate subsequent improvements into the existing system.74 As real-option 
theory indicates, the ability to postpone such choices can be an important 
source of value, provided that the interfaces are clearly defined and remain 
stable.75 
Like any modular system, protocol layering embodies a precommitment 
about the types of information permitted to pass between modules. Prevent-
ing adjacent modules from acting on certain types of information reduces 
the complexity of the system by constraining the number of interdependen-
cies that must be taken into account. At the same time, prohibiting modules 
from taking into account all of the possible information inevitably limits 
both the efficiency and functionality of the resulting system.  
In terms of efficiency, the generality of the layers necessarily means that 
certain customized solutions tailored to particular situations must be fore-
gone.76 The layers and the interfaces connecting them predefine and limit 
the way those layers interact.77  
 
71 See Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Managing in an Age of Modularity, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 84, 85 (“Different companies can take responsibility for separate 
modules and be confident that a reliable product will arise from their collective efforts.”). 
72 Langlois & Robertson, supra note 70, at 301. 
73 Baldwin & Clark, supra note 71, at 91; see also Karl Ulrich, The Role of Product Architecture in 
the Manufacturing Firm, 24 RES. POL’Y 419, 435 (1995) (“For the modular architecture, detailed 
design of each component can proceed almost independently and in parallel.”). 
74 Baldwin & Clark, supra note 71, at 91. 
75 See BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 48, at 234-37 (applying real option theory to show 
how modularity permits industries to postpone having to commit to any particular technological 
solution); id. at 284-93 (discussing the option value of hidden modules). 
76 See RFC 817, supra note 5, at 16, 24 (“[A]n interface, precisely because it is fixed, inevitably 
leads to a lack of complete understanding as to what one layer wishes to obtain from another. This 
has to lead to inefficiency.”); RFC 871, supra note 3, at 20-22 (discussing the tradeoff inherent in 
the fact that fixed layers lead to less design flexibility). Blanchette discusses the loss of efficiency 
resulting from generalization: 
[T]he most efficient programs are hand-tailored, providing no generalization whatso-
ever; conversely, highly general abstractions will result in significant loss in efficiency. 
This is because the specification of an abstraction (the interface) general enough to 
accommodate a wide range of implementations necessarily involves trade-offs, between 
the freedom that the abstraction provides and the efficiency of possible implemen-
tation.  
Blanchette, supra note 25, at 1046-47 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77 See TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 27 (“The interface defines which primitive operations 
and services the lower layer makes available to the upper one.”); Parnas, supra note 29, at 339 
(“The connections between modules are the assumptions which the modules make about each 
other.”). 
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Engineers have long recognized that hiding information can both harm 
and promote innovation. Specifically, innovation that depends upon the 
sharing of particular information cannot proceed if that information is held 
in another layer and if the particular form of modularity imposed by the 
architecture does not permit that information to pass through the protocol 
stack. The aforementioned information hiding means that layering “hide[s] 
vital information that lower layers may need to optimize their performance” 
and requires “that the optimization of each layer . . . be done separately,” 
which can “conflict with efficient implementation of data manipulation 
functions.”78 
In other words, design hierarchies represent something of a mixed bless-
ing from the standpoint of innovation.79 On the one hand, they facilitate 
innovation that is consistent with the hierarchy. Indeed, the existing layered 
architecture has proven incredibly robust. On the other hand, predetermin-
ing the locus of the interfaces and the information that can pass between 
layers discourages innovations that are inconsistent with the hierarchy.80 
Protocol layering also limits the network’s ability to evolve. Any system 
of modularity necessarily envisions that change to the basic architecture will 
occur relatively slowly.81 For the most part, the stability of the architecture 
yields benefits. Predefining the interactions between particular components 
makes it easier to make changes to individual components without disturbing 
the system as a whole. Without a high degree of stability, actors could not 
innovate in individual layers with any confidence.82  
At the same time, however, this stability can impede the network’s abil-
ity to evolve into a fundamentally different architecture. Economic theory 
has long recognized that having an installed base in a network industry can 
 
78 RFC 3439, supra note 26, at 7-8; see also Crowcroft et al., supra note 26, at 23 (“[T]he flip 
side to modularization and data-hiding is that tuning the efficiency of the data path for transfer of 
data becomes difficult . . . . Vertical partitioning emphasises the discontinuities in the data path, 
which then obstruct the application from receiving the quality of service it requires.”). 
79 Christopher S. Yoo, Product Life Cycle Theory and the Maturation of the Internet, 104 NW. U. 
L. REV. 641, 655-56 (2010). 
80 See Kim B. Clark, The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological 
Evolution, 14 RES. POL’Y 235, 246 (1985) (using automobiles as an example and noting that “[o]nce 
choices about core concepts in engines were established, innovative effort moved down into 
subsidiary parameters”). 
81 See COMM. ON THE INTERNET IN THE EVOLVING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 
2, at 38 (arguing that innovation at the “center of the network” is slow because building new 
features into the existing network requires coordinating the actions of multiple developers); 
Parnas et al., supra note 66, at 409 (explaining that changes to modular interfaces should be 
limited to changes that are unlikely to be needed). 
82 See Blanchette, supra note 25, at 1054. 
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lead to technological lock-in.83 Placing such considerations in a design 
hierarchy amplifies this effect, as any change to the architecture requires 
parallel changes in the levels both above and below.84 This process provides 
a new perspective on what is sometimes termed “Internet time.”85 Although 
innovation within layers proceeds at breakneck speeds, innovation in the 
architecture proceeds at a glacial pace.86 
The sociology of technology provides another drag on innovation.87 The 
emergence of a design hierarchy establishes a technical agenda for a prod-
uct’s development, directing further innovation along particular lines.88 
Established technological paradigms guide research along innovation 
avenues consistent with the incumbent design hierarchy.89 These paradigms 
become ingrained in the institutional filters that organizations use to 
manage information, which tends to further reinforce the status quo.90 The 
engineering literature is replete with complaints that the ossification of the 
Internet is preventing the architecture from evolving.91 The technological 
paradigm established by a design hierarchy even extends into the education 
system. Indeed, some computer science researchers have reportedly ex-
pressed reluctance to pursue research inconsistent with the TCP/IP stack.92 
 
83 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product 
Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 942 (1986) (finding that the existence 
of a large installed base can cause “excess inertia” and make new technology less likely to be 
adopted). 
84 Yoo, supra note 79, at 656. 
85 See generally, e.g., MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO & DAVID B. YOFFIE, COMPETING ON 
INTERNET TIME: LESSONS FROM NETSCAPE AND ITS BATTLE WITH MICROSOFT (1998) 
(discussing and investigating the pace of competition in the Internet age). 
86 See Blanchette, supra note 25, at 1054 (arguing that, contrary to popular conceptions, com-
puting infrastructure evolves slowly). 
87 Yoo, supra note 79, at 651-55. 
88 Blanchette, supra note 25, at 1054. 
89 See Giovanni Dosi, Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories, 11 RES. POL’Y 147, 
152 (1982); Devendra Sahal, Technological Guideposts and Innovation Avenues, 14 RES. POL’Y 61, 71, 
78-79 (1985). 
90 Philip Anderson & Michael L. Tushman, Technological Discontinuities and Dominant 
Designs: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 604, 618 (1990). 
91 See, e.g., Paul Laskowski & John Chuang, A Leap of Faith? From Large-Scale Testbed to 
the Global Internet 2 (Sept. 2009) (paper presented at the 37th Telecomms. Policy Research 
Conf.) (collecting sources indicating that “[t]he predominant view from within the research 
community is that the internet is incapable of significant architectural change” and that “the 
network architecture is described as stagnant, even ossified”). 
92 See Vint Cerf et al., FIND Observer Panel Report 2 (Apr. 9, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.nets-find.net/FIND_report_final.pdf (citing a concern among 
some faculty that “architectural research that is not incremental might be considered ‘too risky’”). 
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Technological and economic changes can often pressure high-tech indus-
tries to evolve toward a fundamentally different architecture.93 Examples 
include the desktop PC’s absorption of functions that used to be provided 
by standalone peripheral devices (such as hard disks, modems, and WiFi 
cards94) and the advent of last-mile broadband networks (such as DSL and 
cable modem systems), both of which undercut the rationale for a 
standalone regional ISP.95 In any layered stack, however, the danger is that 
modularity may inhibit systemic innovation by creating economic pressures 
and organizational structures that lock the existing interfaces into place. It is 
thus too simplistic to suggest that modularity and protocol layering present 
a simple tradeoff between short-run efficiency and long-run evolvability.96 
Indeed, promoting evolvability falls on both the modular and nonmodular 
sides of the balance. Moreover, although the existing regulatory regime is 
often criticized as creating vertical, technology-specific silos that ignore the 
extent to which different means of transmission compete with one another, 
protocol layering risks creating silos of its own.97 
Whether any particular architecture strikes the correct balance depends 
on context. Modular structures reflect the number and location of task 
interdependencies as well as a particular vision of which interdependencies 
multiple layers should be permitted to take into account. Changes in 
technology and end-user demand for network services, however, can cause 
the nature and relative importance of particular interdependencies to 
 
93 See Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come from? Modularity, Transactions, and the 
Boundaries of Firms, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 155, 180 (2008) (noting that “there is no process 
of technological determinism at work driving the task network toward ever-higher levels of 
modularity” and that changes in strategies, knowledge, and technologies can cause “task networks 
to become more integral (i.e., less modular) over time”); Michael G. Jacobides & Sidney G. 
Winter, The Co-Evolution of Capabilities and Transaction Costs: Explaining the Institutional Structure of 
Production, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 395, 405 (2005) (noting how the emergence of new 
productive structures and new knowledge bases can cause the pattern of increasing specialization 
and vertical disintegration to reverse). 
94 See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(discussing the increasing integration between the CPU and certain peripherals); Cal. Computer 
Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing how the new IBM 
computer “integrated the disk control function into the CPU”); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. 
IBM Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228, 231-32 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (describing how IBM abandoned remov-
able disk drives in favor of nonremovable drives with the head-disk assembly integrated into the 
computer itself that provided greater storage capacity), aff ’d sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM 
Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 342 (N.D. 
Okla. 1973) (describing how IBM integrated memory and control units into its CPUs), rev’d on 
other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975). 
95 Yoo, supra note 2, at 33-34. 
96 See VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 7, at 370-71. 
97 See Jacobides & Winter, supra note 93, at 404. 
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change over time. These changing priorities pressure the prevailing modular 
architecture to change. The intensity and the stability of the demands being 
placed on the network may also place a higher premium on efficiency. 
Indeed, an IETF document known as RFC 1958, which is often cited by 
policy advocates as laying out the basic architectural principles underlying 
the Internet,98 recognized that “fundamentally new requirements might lead 
to a fundamentally new protocol.”99 RFC 1958 continues: 
In searching for Internet architectural principles, we must remember that 
technical change is continuous in the information technology industry . . . 
In this environment, some architectural principles inevitably change. Prin-
ciples that seemed inviolable a few years ago are deprecated today. Prin-
ciples that seem sacred today will be deprecated tomorrow. The principle of 
constant change is the only principle of the Internet that should survive 
indefinitely.100  
The document thus squarely rejected the existence of any “dogma about 
how Internet protocols should be designed.”101 
The question, then, is not whether any particular implementation of 
protocol layering should ever change. It surely will eventually, if in-
frequently. Instead, the proper questions are better framed as trying to 
determine the optimal rate of architectural change and how to recognize the 
circumstances under which such changes are warranted. Policymakers 
should therefore develop heuristics for determining the circumstances under 
which such change might be appropriate. Given the key role that stability 
plays in fostering innovation and the costs of making such transitions, 
changes should occur infrequently and should be approached with consider-
able caution.102  
 
98 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 7, at 36; VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 7, at 105. 
99 Architectural Principles of the Internet 3 (IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 1958, B. 
Carpenter ed., 2006) [hereinafter RFC 1958], available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc1958.pdf. 
100 Id. at 1. 
101 Id. at 2. 
102 Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Future Structure of the 
Computer Industry (“It is neither desirable nor even possible to have frequent [pieces of radical 
change]; the costs of all that change are considerable.”), in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND 
THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 155, 161 ( Jeffrey A. 
Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999). 
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II. THE INTERNET AS AN EXAMPLE  
OF A LAYERED ARCHITECTURE 
Perhaps the best way to understand the way protocol layering works and 
the advantages it provides is to examine the history of the ARPANET, 
which was operated by the Defense Department from 1967 to 1990 and 
which is widely recognized as the precursor to the modern Internet.103  
A. Connecting Heterogeneous Hosts 
One of the major challenges facing the ARPANET’s designers was to 
find a way to interconnect the huge variety of computers that end users 
were using as hosts.104 The scope of this problem is depicted in Figure 3, 
which depicts the first four ARPANET sites, each of which used a different 
type of computer as its host. These hosts operated on fundamentally 
incompatible design principles.105 
 
Figure 3: The ARPANET as of December 1969106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
103 See JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 44, 195 (1999) (chronicling the ARPANET’s 
initial funding, in 1967, and its final decommissioning, in 1990). 
104 Id. at 51-53. 
105 Id. at 48. 
106 C. Stephen Carr et al., HOST-HOST Communication Protocol in the ARPA Network, 36 
AFIPS CONF. PROC. 589, 590 fig.1 (1970). 
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The solution was to require each host to attach to the network through a 
minicomputer known as an Interface Message Processor (IMP), which 
served as that host’s contact point with the rest of the network and buffered 
the network against the heterogeneity of the hosts.107 All early IMPs were 
made by the same company from the same technology, ran the same 
software, and interconnected with one another through the same transmission 
protocol.108 The fact that all IMPs were constructed from the same compo-
nents and ran the same software simplified the challenge of managing the 
interactions between IMPs and helped organize them into a large, integrated 
system. Interestingly, the sending-and-receiving IMPs established a virtual 
circuit that confirmed that there was enough room at the destination to 
permit transmission of the message and maintained the flow below the 
maximum rate that the receiving host and the networks supporting the 
connection could accommodate. 
Like the postal service, the ARPANET needed protocols for its network 
to function properly. One protocol dictated communication at the IMP 
level. So long as the hosts presented packets to the IMPs formatted in 
accordance with the protocol, IMPs could accept packets from any type of 
host without knowing anything about the technological principles on which 
that particular host was based.109 At the same time, standardization had the 
reflexive property of relieving the hosts from needing any knowledge of the 
details of the underlying network. 
The ARPANET’s architects also needed to create host-to-host proto-
cols, the most important of which was known as the Network Control 
Protocol (NCP).110 Each host typically ran more than one program at the 
same time.111 Thus, every sending host needed some way to sift through the 
return data streams and to route the incoming data to the correct process. 
The difficulty was that each host employed its own scheme for naming 
 
107 See F.E. Heart et al., The Interface Message Processor for the ARPA Computer Network, 36 
AFIPS CONF. PROC. 551, 551 (1970). Each IMP was initially connected to a single host, although 
the design permitted each IMP to serve up to four hosts. Id. at 553. The architecture was later 
redesigned to permit IMPs to serve larger numbers of hosts. See S.M. Ornstein et al., The 
Terminal IMP for the ARPA Computer Network, 40 AFIPS CONF. PROC. 243, 244-45 (1972). 
108 All IMPs were built by Bolt, Beranek & Newman around a Honeywell DDP-516. See 
Heart et al., supra note 107, at 557-58. 
109 ABBATE, supra note 103, at 52-53. 
110 Carr et al., supra note 106; Alex McKenzie & Jon Postel, Host-to-Host Protocol for the 
ARPANET, in ARPANET PROTOCOL HANDBOOK 5, 11 (Elizabeth Feiner & Jonathan Postel 
eds., 1978). 
111 See Carr et al., supra note 106, at 590-91 (describing the independent uses and time-
sharing system governing the network’s computers). 
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internal processes, and many of these naming schemes were incompatible 
with one another.112 
NCP solved this problem by creating a standardized, intermediate 
scheme for naming processes called sockets, which were a series of virtual 
ports (represented by a socket number) that organized incoming and 
outgoing traffic.113 To ensure that both the sending and receiving hosts 
knew which socket to use for a given session, the sending host would send a 
command, known as a request for connection, that specified the socket it 
would like to use for sending the traffic as well as the socket it would like to 
use for receiving the traffic associated with that connection.114 The receiving 
host that accepted the connection would respond by identifying the sockets 
it planned to use to send and receive traffic.115 This exchange became known 
as the opening handshake.116 After the communication was completed, the 
sending and receiving hosts exchanged messages containing a close command, 
notifying both hosts that the sockets could be released and made available 
for other processes.117 The use of sockets thus permitted each host to use its 
own system for mapping its internal scheme for naming processes onto 
particular sockets.118 
NCP also played an important role in flow control and reliability. In 
order to prevent a flood of incoming messages from a faster source, or from 
the simultaneous arrival of flows from multiple sources that exceeded an 
IMP’s or host’s ability to process them, NCP prevented the IMP connected 
to the sending host from forwarding the next packet in a communication 
until the destination host’s IMP successfully sent a return message, known 
as a Request for Next Message (RFNM). This return message confirmed 
that the previous packet had been successfully delivered and that the 
incoming link was now unblocked and available for additional traffic.119 
 
112 Id. at 591. 
113 Id. at 591-92. 
114 Id. at 592-93. 
115 The request for connection used to initiate a connection was called a sender-to-receiver 
(STR) command, whereas the message accepting a request for connection was known as a 
receiver-to-sender (RTS) command. McKenzie & Postel, supra note 110, at 15. 
116 See Requirements for Internet Hosts—Communication Layers 93 (IETF Network Working 
Grp. RFC No. 1122, R. Braden ed., 1989) [hereinafter RFC 1122], available at http://tools.ietf.org/ 
pdf/rfc1122 (describing a connection attempt as a “three-way handshake”). 
117 McKenzie & Postel, supra note 110, at 17. 
118 Carr et al., supra note 106, at 591-92. The specification of this proposal appears as S. 
Crocker et al., New HOST-HOST Protocol (IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 33, 1970), 
available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc33. 
119 Carr et al., supra note 106, at 590; Heart et al., supra note 107, at 553. NCP was later mod-
ified to allow the number of packets in transit to vary. McKenzie & Postel, supra note 110, at 18-20. 
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Interestingly, the ARPANET placed responsibility for RFNMs on the 
IMPs connected to the hosts rather than on the hosts themselves.120 Some 
engineers presciently suggested that responsibility for this function properly 
resided with the receiving host rather than with its IMP.121 Moreover, the 
ARPANET ensured reliability on a hop-by-hop basis, as each IMP retained 
a copy of the data until it received confirmation that the downstream IMP 
had received it successfully.122  
NCP was not the only host-to-host protocol. The ARPANET’s protocol 
architects designed other host-to-host protocols to meet different needs, 
such as the Network Voice Protocol (NVP) designed to support packet 
voice.123 Because real-time communications are more tolerant of packet loss 
than other transmissions, NVP did not require IMPs to retransmit lost 
packets.124 Moreover, because both the source and destination hosts were 
 
Instead of waiting to send an RFNM until the network is not congested, another approach is 
to allow the receiving host to instruct its IMP to send a request to stop sending. The sending host 
would then hold any additional traffic until the receiving host sent a message authorizing the 
sending host to resume its transmission. S. Crocker, Protocol Notes 2 (IETF Network Working 
Grp. RFC No. 36, 1970), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc36. The protocol designers would 
obviate this requirement by having the sending hosts maintain a counter that increased or 
decreased based on commands sent by the receiving host. Instead of sending a specific request to 
stop sending, the receiving host could accomplish the same end simply by refusing to send the 
command to increment the counter. Steve Crocker et al., An Official Protocol Proffering 2 (IETF 
Network Working Grp. RFC No. 54, 1970), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc54. 
120 Carr et al., supra note 106, at 590; Heart et al., supra note 107, at 554. 
121 See M. Elie, Comments on Memory Allocation Control Commands CEASE, ALL, GVB, RET) 
and RFNM 1 (IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 68, 1970), available at http://tools.ietf. 
org/pdf/rfc68 (“[T]here is no reason why the RFNM could not be initiated by the receiving host 
as an acknowledgment of the correct reception of the message . . . .”); J. Kreznar, Some Questions 
Re: HOST-IMP Protocol 1 (IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 17, 1969), available at http:// 
tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc17 (quoting Stephen Crocker as asking, “Can a HOST, as opposed to its IMP, 
control RFNM’s?”); accord J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277, 282 (1984) (“Another strategy for obtaining immediate 
acknowledgments is to make the target host sophisticated enough that when it accepts delivery of 
a message it also accepts responsibility for guaranteeing that the message is acted upon by the 
target application.”). 
122 Heart et al., supra note 107, at 554. 
123 Danny Cohen, Specifications for the Network Voice Protocol (NVP) (IETF Network Working 
Grp. RFC No. 741, 1976), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc741; Dan Cohen, A Protocol for 
Packet Switching Voice Communication, 2 COMPUTER NETWORKS 320, 326-29 (1978) (discussing 
early development of NVP and the establishment of “real-time high quality voice conferencing”); 
Robert F. Sproull & Dan Cohen, High-Level Protocols, 66 PROC. IEEE 1371, 1377-80 (1978) 
(describing the purposes and challenges of NVP). 
124 See Sproull & Cohen, supra note 123, at 1379 (“No retransmission to remedy errors is 
required because a lost message is not catastrophic . . . . Moreover, retransmission would 
introduce highly variable delays that cause worse perceptual damage than the loss of the message. 
The only effect of a lost message is an audible error for the period represented by the missing 
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operating in real time, NVP also omitted RFNM-based flow control 
associated with NCP.125 Interestingly, it is the unreliable service associated 
with NVP, informed by Louis Pouzin’s experience with a similar French 
network known as CYCLADES,126 that would serve as the model for IP, 
the protocol that would knit the entire Internet together. 
The original solicitation of formal bids on the ARPANET project div-
ided the network into two parts: a user subnet that would support functions 
used by hosts (and thus by end users) and a communications subnet that 
managed the functions of IMPs.127 The ARPANET’s designers began to 
refer to these subnets as two different layers.128 From this perspective, the 
ARPANET can be disaggregated into two distinct layers: a host layer 
responsible for organizing the functions provided by the hosts and a com-
munications layer consisting of the IMPs and the leased telephone lines.129 
As is true generally speaking, the primary advantage of layering within the 
ARPANET was that it allowed the set of functions in one layer to largely 
ignore the detailed internal mechanics of the functions in the other layers.130 
 
Figure 4: ARPANET Protocols as a  
Two-Layer Stack (circa 1970)131 
 
Layer  Location Functions 
Host Host-to-Host 
Handles user activities; initiates and 
maintains connections between hosts 
Communication IMP-to-IMP 
Moves data through the subnet using packet 
switching; ensures reliable transmission 
 
 
data.”). The mild effect of a lost message in the voice context stands in contrast to the high 
reliability required in transmitting more sensitive data. 
125 Id. 
126 ABBATE, supra note 103, at 125. 
127 See F. HEART ET AL., REPORT NO. 4799, A HISTORY OF THE ARPANET: THE FIRST 
DECADE, at III-14 to -24 (1981), available at http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/chris/DIGITAL_ 
ARCHIVE/ARPANET/DARPA4799.pdf (discussing the criteria of the 1968 request for quotes); see 
also Heart et al., supra note 107, at 551 (“This approach divides the genesis of the ARPA Network 
into two parts: (1) design and implementation of the IMP subnet, and (2) design and implementa-
tion of protocols and techniques for the sensible utilization of the network by the Hosts.”). 
128 See Stephen D. Crocker et al., Function-Oriented Protocols for the ARPA Computer Network, 
40 AFIPS CONF. PROC. 271, 271 (1972) (describing the “layers” in the protocols in the ARPANET). 
129 Heart et al., supra note 107, at 552-53. 
130 RFC 871, supra note 3, at 3 (“[Layering is designed so that] a given set of related func-
tions . . . should not take special cognizance of the detailed internal mechanics of another set of 
related functions . . . .”). 
131 ABBATE, supra note 103, at 53. 
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Combining all host functions into a single layer meant that host-system 
programmers had to design host-to-host connection systems into every 
program they wrote, even though many programs required the exact same 
functions. The protocol designers reduced this redundancy by conceptually 
disaggregating the host layer into two separate subnetworks. The host 
subnetwork represented the host-to-host functions associated with NCP, 
which provided general connection services needed by many applications. 
The end-user subnetwork encompassed the user interfaces and functionality 
employed by particular programs, such as file transfers and remote logins.132 
Although the protocol designers did not yet use the term, a modern observer 
would characterize this as a decision to divide what was previously consid-
ered a single host layer into separate host and applications layers.133 
 
Figure 5: ARPANET Protocols as a  
Three-Layer Stack (circa 1973)134 
 
Layer  Location Functions 
Application 
Process-to-
process 
Handled user activities 
Host Host-to-Host 
Initiated and maintained connections between 
hosts 
Communication IMP-to-IMP 
Moved data through the subnet using packet 
switching; ensured reliable transmission 
B. Interconnecting Heterogeneous Transmission Technologies 
In addition to interconnecting heterogeneous hosts, another goal of the 
Internet project was to enable the interconnection of heterogeneous trans-
mission technologies. The solution to this problem was devised by Vinton 
Cerf and Robert Kahn.135 Their solution was to divide the packet switches 
 
132 See Peggy M. Karp, Origin, Development and Current Status of the ARPA Network (compar-
ing the host subnetwork and the user-level subnetwork), in DIGEST OF PAPERS: “COMPUTING 
NETWORKS FROM MINI THROUGH MAXIS—ARE THEY FOR REAL?”, PROC. 7TH ANNUAL 
IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y INT’L CONF. 49, 49-50 (1973); see also RFC 871, supra note 3, at 13 
(distinguishing the Host-Host layer, which confers interprocess communication functionality, and 
the Process Level/Applications layer, which contains those protocols that perform resource sharing 
and remote access functions). 
133 ABBATE, supra note 103, at 67-68. 
134 Id. at 68. 
135 They laid out the solution in their classic 1974 paper. See Vinton G. Cerf & Robert E. 
Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 637 
(1974). 
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into two types: those that operated entirely within one type of network—
later known as interior nodes or switches—and those that operated at the 
border between two different types of networks—which the authors called 
gateways and which were later known as routers.136 The distinction between 
interior and gateway nodes greatly simplified the management problem by 
restricting the number of nodes that needed to know information about how 
to connect different types of networks. Information needed to interconnect 
with other types of networks, such as addressing, status detection, routing, 
and fault detection, could be restricted to the gateways.137 
To minimize the problems of interconnecting disparate networks, Cerf 
and Kahn proposed that all networks employ a single, uniform addressing 
scheme.138 In addition, instead of having each gateway identify the “lan-
guage” spoken by the next network and translate it, Cerf and Kahn established 
a single common language that all networks could understand.139 To facili-
tate its use by multiple networks, this common language was kept as simple 
as possible and included only the minimum information needed to transmit 
the communication.140 All of this information was placed in an internetwork 
header that every gateway could read without modifying.141 
The result was to subdivide what was previously called the communica-
tion layer into two distinct layers: one responsible for internetwork commu-
nications—which was then called the Internet layer and would later be 
called the network layer—and another responsible for intranetwork commu-
nications—which was then called the network access layer. The result is the 
four-layer stack depicted in Figure 6. 
  
 
136 See id. at 638 (introducing the concept of gateways, which serve as the interfaces between 
different types of networks). 
137 ABBATE, supra note 103, at 128-29. 
138 See Cerf & Kahn, supra note 135, at 641 (“A uniform internetwork TCP address space, 
understood by each gateway and TCP, is essential to routing and delivery of internetwork 
packets.”); see also Vinton G. Cerf & Peter T. Kirstein, Issues in Packet-Network Interconnection, 66 
PROC. IEEE 1386, 1393-99 (1978) (discussing the common internal address structure required for 
packet-level interconnectivity). 
139 Cerf & Kahn, supra note 135, at 638-39. 
140 See Barry M. Leiner et al., The DARPA Internet Protocol Suite, IEEE COMM., Mar. 1985, 
at 29, 31 (“The decision on what to put into IP and what to leave out was made on the basis of the 
question ‘Do gateways need to know it?’.”). 
141 Cerf & Kahn, supra note 135, at 638-39. 
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Figure 6: ARPANET Protocols as a  
Four-Layer Stack (circa 1974)142 
 
Layer  Location Functions 
Application 
Process-to-
process 
Handled user activities 
Host Host-to-Host 
Initiated and maintained connections 
between pairs of host processes 
Internet 
Gateway-to-
gateway 
Moves data between networks 
Network Access 
Switch-to-
switch 
Moved data within networks 
 
 
In the initial design, both interdomain routing and the host-to-host 
functions, such as reliability, were managed by a single large protocol called 
the Transmission Control Program.143 After several years of trying to make 
this architecture work, the protocol architects realized that combining 
router-to-router and host-to-host functions within a single protocol contra-
vened the basic principles of protocol layering. They decided to split the 
Transmission Control Program into two separate protocols: a host-to-host 
protocol called the Transmission Control Protocol and a router-to-router 
protocol called the Internet Protocol. As a result, the acronym changed 
from simply TCP to TCP/IP.144 
The decision to split the protocol into two parts reflected a fundamental 
insight about the key layer of connectivity. The key to maintaining univer-
sal interconnectivity was the Internet Protocol running in the network 
 
142 Leiner et al., supra note 140, at 29, 31 fig.3; see also RFC 1122, supra note 116, at 8-10 (listing 
and explaining the four-layer stack consisting of application, transport, Internet, and link layers, 
analogous to those depicted in Figure 6). 
143 Cerf & Kahn, supra note 135, at 640. 
144 See Jon Postel, Comments on Internet Protocol and TCP 1 (Internet Experiment Note No. 2, 
Aug. 15, 1977), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/ien/ien2.txt (“We are screwing up in 
our design of internet protocols by violating the principle of layering. Specifically we are trying to 
use TCP to do two things: serve as a host level end to end protocol, and to serve as an internet 
packaging and routing protocol. These two things should be provided in a layered and modular 
way. I suggest that a new distinct internetwork protocol is needed, and that TCP be used strictly 
as a host level end to end protocol.”); see also David D. Clark, The Design Philosophy of the DARPA 
Internet Protocols, COMPUTER COMM. REV., Aug. 1988, at 106, 109 (discussing how differences in 
applications’ need for reliability led designers to separate TCP into two host-to-host protocols 
(TCP and UDP) and a single router-to-router protocol (IP)). 
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layer.145 This approach envisioned innovation in the hosts and applications 
operating in the layers above the network layer as well as in network 
resources operating in the layers below the network layer. Both sides could 
ignore any heterogeneity on the other side so long as the various compo-
nents exchanged information through the Internet Protocol. Moreover, the 
fields in the interface established by the Internet Protocol limited the 
functionality of the network by determining what information could pass 
from the hosts to the routers and switches and vice versa. 
Although the ARPANET’s success and scope made it the most promi-
nent packet-switched network sponsored by the Department of Defense, it 
was by no means the only one. ARPA also created the San Francisco Bay 
Area Packet Radio Network (PRNET). First operational in 1975, the 
PRNET enabled mobile hosts—including one in a radio-equipped van—to 
connect to four packet-radio repeaters located at high points around the Bay 
and to a central control station located at the Stanford Research Institute 
(SRI).146 Another was the Atlantic Packet Satellite Network (SATNET), 
which used a satellite to establish a packet-switched connection to locations 
in Maryland, West Virginia, England, and Sweden.147 
The presence of multiple, independent packet-switched networks inevi-
tably led ARPA to look for ways to interconnect them.148 But inter-
connecting networks that employed different technologies proved signifi-
cantly more difficult than interconnecting the technologically identical 
IMPs associated with the ARPANET. As an initial matter, PRNET and 
SATNET created the possibility of multipath routing by employing 
broadcast technologies capable of simultaneously transmitting the same 
packet to multiple recipients instead of establishing a connection and 
 
145 See Cerf & Kahn, supra note 135, at 638; Leiner et al., supra note 140, at 31; RFC 1958, 
supra note 99, at 2-3; see also KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 4, at 52-53; TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 
432. 
146 See Robert E. Kahn et al., Advances in Packet Radio Technology, 66 PROC. IEEE, 1468, 
1488-90 (1978) (describing and diagramming the PRNET). The PRNET benefited from the 
operational experience of a Hawaii-based packet radio network known as ALOHA. See Norman 
Abramson, The ALOHA System—Another Alternative for Computer Communications, 37 AFIPS 
CONF. PROC. 281, 282-85 (1970) (describing the random-access radio communications developed 
for use within the ALOHA system); R. Binder et al., ALOHA Packet Broadcasting—A Retrospect, 
44 AFIPS CONF. PROC. 203, 203-15 (1975) (discussing packet broadcasting systems generally and 
focusing on lessons learned from the ALOHANET). 
147 See generally Vinton G. Cerf, Packet Satellite Technology Reference Sources 2 (IETF Network 
Working Grp. RFC No. 829, 1982), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc829 (describing 
SATNET as “a packet satellite system which would support the sharing of a common, high speed 
channel among many ground stations”); Irwin Mark Jacobs et al., General Purpose Packet Satellite 
Networks, 66 PROC. IEEE 1448, 1460-65 (1978) (discussing SATNET’s experimental facilities, 
measurement activities, and results). 
148 See ABBATE, supra note 103, at 121-22. 
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transferring packets between two specific hosts.149 In addition, SATNET 
was subject to propagation delays that were much longer than those associ-
ated with the other networks.150 Spectrum-based transmission technologies 
like those used in PRNET and SATNET were also much more prone to 
packet loss than telephone-based transmission technologies. As a result, 
these networks employed network-based error recovery rather than simply 
relying on the hosts.151 The packet switches within these different networks 
also provided radically different levels of service in terms of packet size, 
reliability, error correction, in-order packet delivery, and transmission 
speeds.152 Finally, each network employed its own distinct scheme for 
assigning addresses to individual hosts.153 
The International Network Working Group (INWG), a group working 
parallel with the ARPANET project, considered various solutions to these 
problems.154 One was to require every host to implement every protocol 
used by other types of networks.155 Another proposed solution was to allow 
each network to be aware of all other protocols and to translate the commu-
nication whenever it crossed a boundary between networks. The INWG 
rejected such systems as too cumbersome and prone to failure, particularly 
when the translation involved protocols employing fundamentally different 
principles.156 Moreover, translation programming would also have to be 
updated whenever a new networking technology was added, with the 
 
149 See Jacobs et al., supra note 147, at 1449 (noting that SATNET was a broadcast technology 
that could send “at any given time to all earth stations within its transmission coverage area” with 
only one hop); Kahn et al., supra note 146, at 1469, 1480 (noting that the PRNET was based on a 
single-hop broadcasting system that “is not a particularly efficient mode of operation for two party 
communications, but it is a very robust way to distribute packets to all parts of the net”). 
150 See Jacobs et al., supra note 147, at 1449 (noting that packet satellite networks are subject 
to propagation delays of roughly 250 milliseconds, making the round-trip delay a total of 500 
milliseconds, or half a second). 
151 See id. (noting that “[f]orward error correction techniques provide an efficient way to 
improve error performance” with respect to satellite networks); id. at 1458 (discussing the use and 
suppression of network-based reliability in the PODA algorithm employed in SATNET); Kahn et 
al., supra note 146, at 1479, 1492-93 (noting that packet radio networks are subject to higher error 
rates than wire-based communications and that, as a result, the PRNET used forward-error 
correction rather than leaving error correction to the hosts). 
152 ABBATE, supra note 103, at 121-22. 
153 Cerf & Kahn, supra note 135, at 641. 
154 ABBATE, supra note 103, at 131-32. 
155 See Cerf & Kahn, supra note 135, at 638. 
156 See ABBATE, supra note 103, at 128 (noting that designers considered requiring every net-
work to be able to translate all existing host protocols, but rejected it because such a scheme would 
not scale and would not work seamlessly); Cerf & Kirstein, supra note 138, at 1399 (discussing the 
possibility of translating protocols at every boundary between networks, noting that mismatches in 
concept and the lack of a common address space would limit the functionality of such an approach 
and the difficulty of sequentially translating across multiple networks). 
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number of updates increasing combinatorially as the number of protocols 
increased. 
Perhaps the most celebrated demonstration of how gateways could facil-
itate the interconnection of heterogeneous networks occurred in 1977, when 
a communication initiated by a truck connected to the PRNET in the San 
Francisco area was routed through the ARPANET to London, transmitted 
via SATNET from London to West Virginia, rerouted again through an 
ARPANET connection in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and delivered to the 
University of Southern California’s Information Sciences Institute in 
Marina del Rey, California.157 The initial implementation of the network 
layer was incomplete, in that the network layer protocol was implemented 
on a network-by-network basis and discarded at the gateways. In effect, 
what we now think of as the network layer operated more like an end-to-
end transport layer until gateways became more universally deployed. 
 
Figure 7: Interconnecting the ARPANET with the  
Packet Radio and Satellite Radio Networks158 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The four-layer stack envisioned by the ARPANET’s protocol architects 
largely ignored the structure below the network layer, lumping all of the 
 
157 See ABBATE, supra note 103, at 131-32. 
158 STANFORD RESEARCH INST., QUARTERLY MANAGEMENT REPORT NO. 15, PROJECT 
NO. 2325-N5, PACKET RADIO SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 6 fig.1 (1976), available at http://archive. 
computerhistory.org/resources/text/2009/102686324.05.01.acc.pdf. 
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functions below it into a single network access layer.159 In so doing, this 
model failed to consider that a particular medium can run more than one 
networking technology (for example, spectrum can run Ethernet, 802.11 
(WiFi), 802.16 (WiMax), or legacy circuit-switched technologies associated 
with telephony). In addition, the same networking technologies could run 
on different physical media (for example, Ethernet can run on a wide 
variety of wireline and wireless technologies). To take this additional level 
of abstraction into account, the Internet Protocol stack borrowed a concept 
from another stack known as the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
Reference Model and divided the lowest layer into a data-link layer and a 
physical layer.160 The result is the five-layer Internet stack in Figure 8 that 
appears in every modern textbook on network engineering. 
 
Figure 8: The Modern TCP/IP Reference Model161 
 
Layer  Location Protocols 
Application Process-to-process 
SMTP (email), HTTP (web), FTP (file 
transfer), Telnet (remote login) 
Transport Host-to-Host TCP (reliable); UDP (unreliable) 
Network Router-to-router Internet Protocol 
Datalink Switch-to-switch 
Ethernet, connection oriented (X.25, ATM, 
Frame Relay), wireless (802.11, Bluetooth) 
Physical Within network 
Twisted pair (telephone), coaxial cable, 
fiber optics, spectrum 
 
 
What is perhaps most striking is that although the ARPANET’s proto-
col architects embraced layering as a fundamental principle from the very 
beginning, the design they ultimately adopted did not adhere to any 
preconceived notion about how functions should be divided among the 
different layers. Instead, as is typical of any modular design,162 the layered 
model evolved during the design process through experimentation and 
 
159 TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 44, 49. 
160 Zimmermann, supra note 3, at 430; see also Sicker, supra note 10, at 10 (distinguishing 
access providers and transport providers in the physical network). 
161 See, e.g., COMER, supra note 4, at 161-63; KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 4, at 51-53; 
TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 49. 
162 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
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compromise rather than through a precommitment to a particular set of 
principles around which the network architecture should be organized.163 
In fact, when the TCP/IP Reference Model first emerged, it was far 
from a monolith. During the late 1980s, many people believed that it was 
simply a transitional step toward a more general architecture based on the 
OSI Reference Model championed by the International Standards Organi-
zation (ISO)164 or that the TCP/IP and the OSI models would coexist for a 
long time.165 In fact, the battle between TCP/IP and OSI represented not 
only different philosophies (decentralized vs. centralized control) but also 
different sponsoring communities (netheads vs. bellheads).166  
C. The TCP/IP Reference Model 
The foregoing history established the framework for the existing five-
layer protocol stack that underlies the modern Internet. Layers are tradi-
tionally numbered from the bottom of the stack, with the physical layer 
typically called layer 1, the data link layer typically called layer 2, the 
network layer typically called layer 3, the transport layer typically called 
layer 4, and the application layer typically called layer 5. For ease of 
exposition, however, in this Section the model will be presented from the 
top down. 
1. The Application Layer 
As was the case in the ARPANET, the topmost layer in the Internet 
stack is the application layer (typically called layer 5). This layer encom-
passes a wide variety of protocols, each designed to support particular 
classes of applications. For example, the HyperText Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) is the application protocol that supports browsing the World Wide 
Web. It supports the entire class of web browsing programs, including 
 
163 See ABBATE, supra note 103, at 51 (“The ARPANET’s builders did not start out with a 
specific plan for how functions would be divided up among layers or how the interfaces and 
protocols would work. Rather, a layered model evolved as the ARPANET developed.”); 
TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 45 (noting that in the Internet, the protocols preceded the model). 
164 TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 45; see also Geoff Huston, 10 Years Later, ISP COLUMN 
( June 2008), http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2008-06/10years.html (declaring the end of any sus-
picion that the Internet was a “waystop on the road to adoption of the [OSI] framework”). 
165 D. Clark et al., Towards the Future Internet Architecture 3 (IETF Network Working Grp. 
RFC No. 1287, 1991), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc1287. 
166 See generally T.M. DENTON CONSULTANTS, NETHEADS VERSUS BELLHEADS: RE-
SEARCH INTO EMERGING POLICY ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF 
INTERNET PROTOCOLS (Mar. 31, 1999), available at http://www.tmdenton.com/pub/bellheads. 
pdf.; Steve G. Steinberg, Netheads vs. Bellheads, WIRED, Oct. 1996, at 145. 
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Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Apple 
Safari, and Opera, to name a few. Similarly, the Simple Mail Transfer 
Protocol (SMTP) supports all email clients, such as Microsoft Outlook and 
Mozilla Thunderbird, as well as web-based email systems such as Google’s 
Gmail and Microsoft’s Hotmail. Other common application-layer protocols 
include the file transfer protocol (FTP) and Telnet (for remote logins). App-
lication protocols run exclusively within the end host.167 
2. The Transport Layer 
The next highest layer is the transport layer (typically called layer 4). It 
performs functions analogous to the ARPANET’s host-to-host protocol. 
Whereas the application-layer protocols establish connections between 
processes, transport-layer protocols establish connections between hosts.168 
Although the protocol designers envisioned a multitude of transport 
protocols, only two are widely used.169 The first is the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP), which in 1983 replaced NCP as the Internet’s primary 
transport protocol.170 TCP operates on principles that are similar to NCP in 
many ways. As an initial matter, TCP uses a series of ports to direct data 
streams to the appropriate process running on the host.171 Roughly 330 of 
the 65,536 existing ports have been preassigned to commonly used pro-
grams. HTTP, for example, is assigned to port 80, and FTP to port 21.172 
TCP is also similar to NCP in that it uses an initial exchange of messages 
to establish a connection and to inform both hosts as to the port numbers 
that will be used. TCP likewise uses an exchange of messages to close a 
connection. In addition, TCP expects to receive a confirmation for every 
packet it sends. These confirmations are sent by the host, instead of the 
first-hop router to which that host is connected, and are called acknowledg-
ments (ACKs) instead of RFNMs.173 
 
167 KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 4, at 54-55. 
168 TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 42. 
169 See M Handley, Why the Internet Only Just Works, 24 BT TECH. J. 119, 122-23 (2006) (“In 
short, a new transport protocol is not going to become widespread on a time-scale shorter than a 
decade, if ever.”). 
170 ABBATE, supra note 103, at 140-42. 
171 See Cerf & Kahn, supra note 135, at 641 (introducing “the notion of ports in order to permit 
a process to distinguish between multiple message streams” and to allow TCP to “demultiplex[] 
the stream of internetwork packets it receives” and to direct each stream to the appropriate 
process). 
172 KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 4, at 204. 
173 Cerf & Kahn, supra note 135, at 643; see also Saltzer et al., supra note 121, at 282 (relating 
that RFNMs were “never found to be very helpful” because they did not indicate “whether or not 
the target host acted on the message”). 
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TCP and NCP, however, differ in important ways. For example, NCP 
relied on the IMPs to ensure that every packet was delivered safely, while 
TCP places responsibility for reliability on the hosts. Specifically, every 
time TCP transmits a segment, it estimates the time that segment should 
take to reach the receiving host and return to the sender. If it has not 
received an ACK within the expected time frame the host duplicates the 
unacknowledged packet and resends it.174 For reasons discussed in greater 
detail below, TCP also interprets a missing acknowledgment as a sign that 
the network is congested and, in those instances, cuts its sending rate in 
half.175 
The other major transport protocol is known as the User Datagram Pro-
tocol (UDP), which in some ways is the natural successor to NVP. The 
protocol designers had originally thought that only one transport protocol 
was necessary and that all applications would run over TCP. But they soon 
discovered that certain applications do not run particularly well over TCP. 
This is because TCP inherently presumes that if a segment is dropped, the 
application will prefer to use the next available window of bandwidth to 
resend the old segment rather than to send a new segment. Unfortunately, 
the delay of waiting for TCP’s retransmission timer to expire and for TCP 
to resend the packet creates an unacceptable delay for real-time interactive 
media. For example, packet voice works better if the listener asks the 
speaker to simply repeat the garbled message instead of having the applica-
tion lock up while waiting for the dropped packet to be resent.176 
The protocol architects thus created UDP to provide an alternative that 
would better support applications that are sensitive to latency. UDP uses 
the same port structure as TCP to ensure that the traffic arrives at the 
correct process in the receiving host. But unlike TCP, UDP begins trans-
mitting data immediately without awaiting an exchange of messages to open 
a connection between the hosts. Even more importantly, unlike TCP, UDP 
simply sends a stream of segments without waiting for acknowledgments 
from the receiving hosts. As a result, UDP is unable to guarantee reliable 
delivery of messages. Finally, because UDP does not establish a connection 
 
174 This expected time is actually the estimated round-trip time plus a grace period. The 
grace period is usually four times an approximation of the standard deviation of the acknowledg-
ment arrival time. KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 4, at 251-53; TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 552. 
175 See infra Section IV.B. 
176 Clark, supra note 144, at 106, 108-09. The VoIP example is illustrative, although the 
increase in bandwidth and the ability to interpolate missing samples have largely obviated the 
need for retransmissions with respect to VoIP.  
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with the receiving host, it does not need to exchange messages to close a 
transport-layer connection.177 
The transport layer thus provides two very different types of services 
depending on which characteristics applications need the most. Applications 
that need reliability and can tolerate latency can use TCP to ensure reliable, 
error-free delivery. On the other hand, applications that are tolerant of 
packet loss and sensitive to latency are more likely to employ UDP.178 
3. The Network Layer 
The network layer (typically called layer 3) is generally regarded as the 
“glue that holds the entire Internet together,” for this layer provides the 
uniform basis that each network connected to the Internet uses to transmit 
data communications across an ever-changing landscape of technologically 
heterogeneous systems.179 Unlike application- and transport-layer protocols, 
network-layer protocols run in both routers and hosts. But because network-
layer protocols govern only traffic transiting from one network to another, 
network-layer protocols need to run only in gateway routers and do not 
necessarily need to run in the switches operating the inside of a given 
network.180 
The network layer protocol that integrates the entire Internet is known 
as the Internet Protocol (IP).181 Unlike other layers, which are designed to 
permit a variety of protocols each designed to fulfill a different need, the 
network layer can support only a single uniform governing protocol.  
To play this role effectively, IP had to strike a delicate balance. On the 
one hand, it had to include all of the information that any network would 
need to transmit packets to their destinations even when the packets had to 
traverse multiple, technologically heterogeneous networks. On the other 
hand, the desire to minimize the burden of running IP meant that it had to 
be kept as simple as possible.182 As a result, IP encompasses only a minimal 
amount of information, including the source address, the destination 
 
177 See COMER, supra note 4, at 176-77; TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 525-26. 
178 Clark, supra note 144, at 109. 
179 See KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 4, at 53; TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 432. 
180 Leiner, supra note 140, at 30-31. For simplicity, many networks use IP-enabled nodes for 
both routers and switches. 
181 Although IP is the most important network layer protocol, there are others. See TANEN-
BAUM, supra note 4, at 449 (noting additional network layer protocols, including ICMP, ARP, 
RARP, BOOTP, and DHCP). 
182 Leiner, supra note 140, at 31. 
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address, and a small amount of technical information.183 Most importantly 
for the purposes of the current Internet policy debate, IP also allows 
applications to include a type-of-service marker that is intended to support 
prioritization of certain traffic,184 although the syntax of this field has since 
been displaced by a new quality-of-service regime known as Differentiated 
Services.185 The central organizing principle is to limit the network layer to 
the information that routers need to know. 
4. The Data-Link Layer 
The next layer is known as the data-link layer (typically called layer 2). 
Data-link layer protocols share with network-layer protocols the responsibil-
ity for guiding traffic through the network; as a result, data-link layer 
protocols necessarily run in switches as well as hosts. Because the data-link 
layer protocols were designed to govern how packets are transmitted within 
a single network as opposed to between two different networks, the layer is 
supposed to control the behavior of interior nodes,186 although for technical 
reasons, networks may choose to deploy network-layer routers on interior 
nodes.187 Whereas nodes that direct traffic based on network-layer infor-
mation are typically called routers, nodes that direct traffic on the basis of 
data-link layer information are typically called switches.188 
The data-link layer encompasses a wide variety of networking tech-
nologies. One of the most popular is Ethernet, which is almost undoubtedly 
the most widely used protocol in local area networks. Ethernet is basically a 
broadcast protocol that uses an unreliable, connectionless technology to 
send every packet it receives to every end user connected to it.189 
In addition to Ethernet, the data-link layer includes many technologies 
that are byproducts of the connection-oriented approach to networking—
such as Frame Relay and Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM)—on which 
legacy telephone companies have long relied. In fact, ATM was initially 
touted as a replacement for the Internet approach and came complete with 
 
183 Cerf & Kahn, supra note 135, at 638-39. The technical information includes whether the 
packet is IP version 4 or version 6, the length of the header and the accompanying datagram, some 
instructions to guide the network should it have to divide a packet into smaller fragments, and 
some information to support error checking. See TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 432-36. 
184 TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 434. 
185 See generally S. Blake et al., An Architecture for Differentiated Services 12 (IETF Network 
Working Grp. RFC No. 2475, 1998), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc2475. 
186 Leiner, supra note 140, at 30. 
187 KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 4, at 491. 
188 Id. at 491-93. 
189 See generally TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 65-68, 271-91 (describing the history and 
function of Ethernet). 
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its own reference model when launched in the early 1990s. Although it did 
not displace the basic Internet paradigm, it remains widely used in certain 
telephone systems.190 
The data-link layer also encompasses networking technologies designed 
specifically for wireless systems.191 These include the 802.11 family of 
protocols that support the WiFi systems widely used in home routers, the 
802.16 protocol used to support WiMax systems like Clear, and the Blue-
tooth protocols designed to connect mobile phones to other devices. 
Wireless data-link architectures operate on very different principles. The 
frequent collisions resulting from the lack of a medium to monitor other 
users’ activities192 and the inherent unreliability of wave propagation forces 
data-link protocols that support wireless transmission to adopt different 
solutions than those used by wireline technologies.193 
5. The Physical Layer 
The final layer is the physical layer (typically called layer 1), which 
moves individual bits from one node to the next.194 Any path that can 
convey a message sequence can constitute a link in this layer, whether 
physical or not.195 The means of encoding information varies widely de-
pending on whether the carrier wave is composed of visible light passing 
through a fiber optics network, an electromagnetic wave passing through a 
copper wire, or an electromagnetic wave passing through the ether.196 In 
addition, different transmission media can use different approaches to 
modulating the carrier wave, such as varying its amplitude, frequency, or 
phase.197 Media also differ in terms of bandwidth, attenuation, susceptibility 
to interference, and a host of other dimensions.198 
 
190 See id. at 62 (“ATM was much more successful than OSI, and it is now widely used deep 
within the telephone system, often for moving IP packets.”). 
191 Note, however, that like the PRNET, the Ethernet developed from the protocols used to 
run the ALOHANET. See Robert M. Metcalfe & David R. Boggs, Ethernet: Distributed Packet 
Switching for Local Computer Networks, 19 COMM. ACM 395, 396 (1976). 
192 TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 69. Collisions were also a problem on early wired Ethernet 
implementations, but modern implementations have mitigated most of these problems. See id. at 
66-67 (discussing the improved capability of Ethernet to listen for other activity). 
193 Id. at 292-309; KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 4, at 536-58. 
194 COMER, supra note 4, at 160; KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 4, at 51-53; TANENBAUM, 
supra note 4, at 41-44, 48-49. 
195 See Heart et al., supra note 107, at 553 (“A link is a conceptual path that has no physical 
reality . . . .”). 
196 PETERSON & DAVIE, supra note 4, at 64. 
197 TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 126. 
198 See Christopher S. Yoo, The Changing Patterns of Internet Usage, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 67, 
77-78 (2010). 
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D. Layering’s Implications for Where Functions Are Performed 
The structure of the five-layer Internet stack dictates whether particular 
functions are performed by hosts operating at the network’s edge or nodes 
operating in the network’s core. The hosts operating at the edge of the 
network run all five levels of the stack, whereas the routers operating in the 
core of the network run only the bottom three layers. In addition, although 
the bottom three layers of the network stack—the network, data-link, and 
physical layers—operate in the routers serving as gateways between two 
networks, the switches operating inside a network run only the bottom two 
layers of the stack—the data-link and physical layers. 
 
Figure 9: Where Layers Run199 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, the interface between the transport and the network layer defines 
a key boundary for determining where functions are performed. Although 
important exceptions exist, as a general matter services performed at or 
above the transport layer are provided by hosts, while the network layer 
defines the upper boundary for services provided by the routers and switches.200 
III. CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE LAYERED MODEL  
APPEARING IN THE LEGAL LITERATURE 
Despite the engineering community’s embrace of the five-layer Internet 
stack, discussions of protocol layering appearing in the legal commentary 
rarely frame the architecture in these terms. The most common approach 
condenses the layered model into a four-layer stack by compressing the 
 
199 For a similar figure, see Leiner et al., supra note 140, at 30 fig.2. 
200 COMM. ON THE INTERNET IN THE EVOLVING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 126. 
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transport and network layers into a single layer.201 Others compress the 
analysis into a two-layer model that emphasizes a single interface separating 
the upper layers from the lower layers.202 In either event, these commenta-
tors generally propose keeping the interfaces between layers open.203  
A. Combining the Transport and Network  
Layers into a Single Layer 
Combining the transport layer and the network layer into a single layer 
deprives the layered model of much of its analytical power and misperceives 
the network layer’s function as the basis for universal connectivity.204 
Indeed, the decision to separate the transport from the network layer 
represents one of the central architectural decisions underlying the Internet; 
this decision was essential to supporting real-time applications, such as 
packet voice.205 For content and application providers, the critical resource 
is access to the network layer (and thus to the interface between the 
transport and the network layer).206 Combining the transport and network 
layers buries the key interface in the middle of a reconceptualized layer. As 
 
201 See, e.g., ZITTRAIN, supra note 7, at 67-68; Entman, supra note 12, at 2; Craig McTaggart, 
A Layered Approach to Internet Legal Analysis, 48 MCGILL L.J. 571, 582 (2003); Sicker & Blumen-
saadt, supra note 37, at 309-10; Werbach, supra note 7, at 59-64; Whitt, supra note 7, at 624; see also 
LESSIG, supra note 7, at 23-25 (discussing a three-layer model). 
202 See Cannon, supra note 11, at 196-97 (conceiving of the network stack as a physical layer 
beneath a logical layer); Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the 
Digital Age, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 59, 78 (2005) (describing “the legacy 
regulatory structure” as “a nascent two-layer framework”); Whitt, supra note 7, at 652-53 
(identifying the two-layer model as underlying the current regulatory regime and criticizing it for 
“miss[ing] the importance of interfaces between layers” (citing Werbach, supra note 7, at 55-56)); 
Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. 
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 22-23 (2006) (describing proposals for an “implicit, but 
un-codified two-layer system”); Wu, supra note 7, at 1191 (“So while there are actually four layers 
in the Internet architecture, for many purposes the most important distinction is between the 
transport layers . . . and the interpretation layers . . . .”). 
203 See Entman, supra note 12, at 16 (“Most participants agreed that . . . public policy should 
keep interfaces open to interconnection at each layer.”); Werbach, supra note 202, at 81-82 
(arguing for reorienting regulation to keep the connective layers open, including the one 
intermediating between the application layer and the physical layer); Wu, supra note 7, at 1192 
(focusing on the need for regulation to keep open the interface between the application layer and 
the transport layer). 
204 See supra subsection II.C.3. 
205 See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text. 
206 See COMM. ON THE INTERNET IN THE EVOLVING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 128-29 (noting that inability to access the network layer would “constrain[] user 
choice and deteriorate[] . . . the quality of products”); RFC 1958, supra note 99, at 2 (“The key 
to global connectivity is the inter-networking layer.”). 
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such, it obscures important issues by making it impossible to examine access 
at this interface. 
Moreover, the transport layer runs exclusively in hosts, while the net-
work layer defines the upper boundary for services provided by the routers 
and switches.207 Compressing the layers in this manner thus contradicts the 
central tenet of layering that limits entities to interacting only with their 
peers—gateways only with other gateways, hosts only with other hosts.208 
Combining a layer that operates in both routers and hosts with one that 
runs solely at the edge of the network makes it impossible to map the 
resulting layered stack onto the end-to-end argument.209 Finally, if the 
single-logical-layer argument is combined with an argument for nondiscrim-
ination in the logical layer,210 users would be prohibited from utilizing one 
of the core features built into the network layer from the outset: the Type-
of-Service flag included in IP to permit prioritization.211 These problems 
have led even engineers who are sympathetic to the goals of network 
neutrality to criticize the manner in which these models have oversimplified 
the TCP/IP Reference Model.212 
B. Dumb Pipes vs. the Hourglass Model 
In addition to permitting the Internet to run a wide variety of applica-
tions and host processes seamlessly, the Internet Protocol also enables the 
network to run an arbitrary variety of transmission technologies. This 
ability is facilitated by a thin, simple layer in the middle of the protocol 
 
207 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
209 See Scott Jordan, A Layered Network Approach to Network Neutrality, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 427, 
443-44 (2007) [hereinafter Jordan, Layered Network Approach]; Scott Jordan, Implications of Internet 
Architecture on Net Neutrality, ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH., May 2009, at 5:1, 5:16 
[hereinafter Jordan, Internet Architecture]. 
210 See, e.g., VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 7, at 73 (“[F]iltering and control mechanisms in the 
network’s core may also violate the layering principle if the mechanisms operate at the Internet 
layer or at a lower layer but access or modify the message . . . .”); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, 
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 168 (2003) (“[A]bsent 
evidence of harm to the local network or the interests of other users, broadband carriers should not 
discriminate in how they treat traffic on their broadband network on the basis of inter-network 
criteria.”). 
211 See supra note 184 and accompanying text. For a description of the Type-of-Service flag, 
see TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 434. 
212 See Jordan, Internet Architecture, supra note 209, at 5:16; Jordan, Layered Network Approach, 
supra note 209, at 443; see also Kai Zhu, Note, Bringing Neutrality to Network Neutrality, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 634 (2007) (criticizing accounts that “simplify[] the technically 
complex and elegant TCP/IP into a ‘dumb pipe’ or a ‘code layer’” as “both technically inaccurate 
and conceptually misleading”). 
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stack to mediate between any heterogeneity in the upper and lower layers. 
The solution was not to require that all of the lower layers be simple or 
uniform, as some proponents of general protocols have suggested.213 
Instead, the architecture envisions a wide variety of technologies both above 
and below the network layer, with many lower layer protocols containing 
sophisticated functionality, including Frame Relay, Asynchronous Transfer 
Mode, Active Queue Management, and MultiProtocol Label Switching. 
 
Figure 10: The Hourglass Model of  
the Internet Protocol Stack214 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is for this reason that the classic representation of the TCP/IP Refer-
ence Model takes the shape of an hourglass, with the Internet Protocol 
serving as the thin waist.215 The hourglass structure emphasizes that only 
 
213 See Cannon, supra note 11, at 197 (dividing information services into lower-layer basic 
services and upper-layer enhanced services); Wu, supra note 7, at 1191-92 (arguing that his 
proposed four-layer model can be simplified into two layers). 
214 For a similar figure, see Steve Deering, Watching the Waist of the Protocol Hourglass, PROC. 
FIFTY-FIRST INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE 2 (2001), available at http://www.ietf.org/ 
proceedings/51/slides/plenary-1/sld002.html. 
215 See COMM. ON THE INTERNET IN THE EVOLVING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
ET AL., supra note 2, at 36, 126-28; Walter Willinger & John Doyle, Robustness and the Internet: 
Design and Evolution, in ROBUST DESIGN: A REPERTOIRE OF BIOLOGICAL, ECOLOGICAL, AND 
ENGINEERING CASE STUDIES 231, 242-43 (Erica Jen ed., 2005); RFC 3439, supra note 26, at 3; 
see also VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 7, at 89 (noting that with “the Internet Protocol as the 
hourglass’s waist,” developers can innovate independently on either end); ZITTRAIN, supra note 7, 
at 67-69 (describing the hourglass and explaining, “It is only the middle that is narrow, containing 
Internet protocol, because it is meant to be as feature-free as possible”). The hourglass model is 
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the network layer must remain uniform and relatively simple. The services 
provided by the upper and lower layers of the protocol stack are anything 
but uniform and can employ complex and elaborate network management 
practices. It is for this reason that many in the engineering community have 
rejected attempts to reduce protocol layering into the simple policy infer-
ence that lower layers should be kept as dumb as possible.216  
C. Layering and Competition Policy 
An additional concern is that analyses based on engineering concepts 
like protocol layering are sometimes offered as substitutes for conventional 
tools of policy analysis. For example, debates over Internet policy some-
times focus on whether a particular practice is consistent with layering 
without addressing whether that practice furthers other policy concerns, 
such as promoting economic competition. In particular, many have invoked 
the layers model to justify subjecting the lower layers of the Internet to 
regulation while largely exempting the upper layers from regulatory scrutiny.217 
 
usually attributed to John Aschenbrenner in connection with the OSI layered stack. See Jean 
Bartik, OSI: From Model to Prototype as Commerce Tries to Keep Pace, DATA COMM., Mar. 1984, at 
307, 314-15; B Carpenter & S Brim, Middleboxes: Taxonomy and Issues 25 (IETF Network Working 
Grp. RFC No. 3234, 2002) [hereinafter RFC 3234], available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc3234.pdf. 
216 See, e.g., Jordan, Internet Architecture, supra note 209, at 5:21; Jordan, Layered Network 
Approach, supra note 209, at 446; see also Zhu, supra note 212, at 634 (offering a technical critique of 
arguments that TCP/IP mandates “dumb pipe[s]”). 
217 See Mark Cooper, Open Communications Platforms: The Physical Infrastructure as the Bedrock 
of Innovation and Democratic Discourse in the Internet Age, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
177, 180 (2003) (arguing for regulation “preserving an open physical layer within the communica-
tions platform” because its owners “are in a unique position” to “employ singular, narrow motives 
and leverage market power in order to protect existing monopoly rents to achieve domination over 
neighboring products”); Susan Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 359, 375-76 (2007) (surveying literature arguing that upper layers should remain 
unregulated); Werbach, supra note 7, at 59-60 (“In general terms, regulation is more justified at 
lower layers, because openness at one layer often allows for innovation at higher layers.”); Whitt, 
supra note 7, at 592 (noting that “when applied in the telecommunications industry context, the 
Network Layers Model targets the lower network layers for discrete regulation based on the 
existence of significant market power” while “leaving otherwise competitive content and 
applications markets unfettered by regulation”). Both Whitt and Werbach later qualified these 
statements by acknowledging that anticompetitive problems can arise in any layer. See Kevin 
Werbach, Bringing Home the Bits, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 59, 80 (2005) (rejecting 
approaches that presuppose heavy regulation on lower layers and little to no regulation on the 
upper layers); Werbach, supra note 7, at 60 n.90 (“Under some circumstances, more extensive 
regulation may be justified at a higher layer, or competition may be sufficient to ensure openness 
without the need for regulatory intervention.”); Whitt, supra note 7, at 635 (“Of course, . . . one 
cannot assume that the exclusive gatekeeper will only exist at the physical layer. Indeed, a recent 
study solicited by the European Commission explains that Next Generation Networks (‘NGNs’) 
likely will contain new ‘control points’ that can reside in any layer or ‘plane’ of the network 
hierarchy.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Other proposals suggest that network management techniques that violate 
protocol layering be regarded as inherently problematic.218 
Calls for singling out the physical layer for regulatory scrutiny are both 
overinclusive and underinclusive. They are underinclusive in that not every 
aspect of the physical layer is characterized by the type of high fixed costs 
that tend to create market failure. The FCC, for instance, has rejected 
regulating backbone providers on the theory that the market is sufficiently 
competitive.219 It is only the “last mile”220 that is the source of concern (and 
even that aspect is becoming more competitive, particularly as the deploy-
ment of 4G LTE makes wireless an increasingly plausible alternative).221 
Hence, many layers commentators argue that the physical layer must be 
disaggregated into core and last-mile components.222 
The underinclusive nature of focusing regulatory attention exclusively 
on the physical layer stems from the fact that market power is possible at 
the upper layers as well, which is reflected in the recent antitrust cases 
against Microsoft and Google.223 Admittedly, upper-layer services are not 
characterized by the high fixed costs that have been the traditional source of 
market domination in the telecommunications industry. That said, other 
economic features such as first-mover advantages, network effects, or 
intellectual property can create anticompetitive concerns. This is why many 
who advocate using layering as the basis for regulatory policy acknowledge 
 
218 See, e.g., Comments of Google, supra note 18, at 69-70 (“Network congestion [manage-
ment] techniques . . . should be consistent with Internet layers architecture . . . .”). 
219 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: 
The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1891 (2007) (describing the FCC’s policy 
that in the absence of a dominant backbone player, individual backbones have sufficient incentive 
to interconnect even absent regulation). 
220 The “last mile” refers to the final leg of the delivery of telecommunications services to 
consumers. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet Access, 22 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 n.3 (2009). 
221 See id. at 17, 40 (describing how the emergence of competition in last-mile broadband 
service justified deregulation); id. at 9-10, 25-27 (tracing the emergence of wireless as the leading 
last-mile broadband platform and noting that “the FCC has specifically rejected the conclusion 
that last-mile broadband services constitute a natural monopoly”). 
222 See Sicker, supra note 10, at 11, 16 (dividing physical layer services into “access,” i.e. last-
mile, and “transport,” i.e. the core of the network); Whitt, supra note 7, at 623-24 (same). 
223 The antitrust authorities’ recent interest in Facebook indicates that market power can 
exist in applications as well. See Christopher S. Yoo, When Antitrust Met Facebook, 19 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1147, 1148-54 (2012) (describing “network effects,” which “exist when the value of 
a network depends on the number of other users connected to the network,” as a source of market 
power for Facebook and other social networking sites). The cable program access rules indicate 
that market power can arise with respect to content as well. Werbach, supra note 202, at 79 (“The 
program access rules in the 1992 Cable Act . . . were designed to prevent cable operators from 
using their dominance of certain high-value content to prevent competition at the physical 
layer . . . .”). 
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that market power can arise at any layer.224 It also explains why the FCC’s 
Open Internet Order “reject[ed] proposals to limit [its] rules to actions 
taken at or below the lower network layer.”225  
Protocol layering is also frequently lauded for its ability to promote 
competition in another way. As a general matter, enabling actors to connect 
without asking permission and to innovate within their layers without 
affecting other layers is likely to promote competition. A closer examina-
tion, however, reveals that the combination of open connectability and 
intra-layer freedom can actually limit competition. Professor Timothy 
Bresnahan has emphasized the potential benefits of what he calls “divided 
technical leadership,” in which firms with similar technical and marketing 
capabilities push against the vertical boundaries separating them in an 
attempt to seize control over key platform elements.226 Regulation that 
mandates access would freeze these interfaces and threaten to block these 
markets from this important source of rivalry.227 While Bresnahan offered 
this theory in a somewhat different context, the same insights apply to the 
Internet with considerable force.  
Other studies have emphasized how coordination between input provid-
ers can internalize the positive externalities created by general purpose 
technologies228 or can allow new entrants to manage the market power 
wielded by input suppliers before undertaking relationship-specific invest-
ments.229 These countervailing considerations underscore the extent to 
which the relationship between openness and competition policy is more 
complex than suggested by the arguments of those who equate layering with 
promoting competition. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE  
ON THE LAYERED MODEL 
There can be little question that the five-layer TCP/IP Reference Model 
that frames the structural analysis of the Internet represents a tremendous 
technical achievement. It has proven remarkably stable and robust, scaling 
to accommodate a dazzling variety of users, applications, and networking 
 
224 Katz, supra note 12, at 37-38; Weiser, supra note 37, at 13; Werbach, supra note 202, at 79; 
Whitt, supra note 7, at 635-36. 
225 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at 17,948 n.235.  
226 Bresnahan, supra note 102, at 166. 
227 See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2005) 
[hereinafter Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality]; Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media 
Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 282-85 (2002). 
228 Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, supra note 36, at 96. 
229 Teece, supra note 36, at 302. 
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technologies. Its past success has understandably led many in the policy 
debate to embrace it as an essential pillar to preserve. 
But the success of the model makes it easy to forget that, like all layered 
architectures, it is the product of a series of tradeoffs determined largely by 
the nature of the underlying technological interdependencies and the nature 
of the services being demanded of the network. It is thus appropriate to 
examine the conditions under which circumstances have changed sufficiently 
to merit changing the architecture as well. 
A. Reliability 
One area that is undergoing technological change is with respect to the 
way that the current layered stack ensures reliability. Although reliability in 
the ARPANET was largely guaranteed by the IMPs operating in the core 
of the network, the existing layered architecture assigns responsibility for 
guaranteeing reliable transmission to the transport layer.230 As a result, the 
current architecture assigns the responsibility for ensuring reliability to the 
hosts operating at the edge of the network. However, the advent of wireless 
transmission technologies has begun to place pressure on the assumption 
that the transport layer should remain the locus for ensuring reliability.  
As noted earlier, when TCP sends a packet, it sets a retransmission timer; 
if it has not received an acknowledgment by the time the timer expires, it 
presumes the packet has been lost and resends it.231 
The rationale generally invoked for this decision is laid out in the land-
mark article on the end-to-end argument by Jerome Saltzer, David Reed, 
and David Clark. They argued that performing intermediate error checking 
provided few additional benefits because the hosts at either end of the 
communication are likely to perform an end-to-end error check anyway, 
which necessarily involves information only available at the network’s 
edge.232 Moreover, implementing reliability in the core would require all 
applications, even those applications whose tolerance for damaged or lost 
 
230 See Geoff Huston, The End of End to End?, ISP COLUMN (May 2008), http://www.potaroo. 
net/ispcol/2008-05/eoe2e.html (noting that the predominant approach to digital networking 
during the 1970s and 1980s required that each switch in a path store a local copy of the data until it 
received confirmation that the downstream switch had received the data and calling approaches 
that placed responsibility for reliability on hosts “heresy”); see also ABBATE, supra note 103, at 125 
(calling approaches giving hosts the responsibility for maintaining reliability “unconventional”). 
231 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
232 Saltzer et al., supra note 121, at 278-81. 
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packets was very high, to bear the delays associated with maintaining 
reliability.233 
For these reasons, the Internet’s protocol designers shifted responsibility 
for error recovery from the nodes to the hosts.234 The nodes in the core of 
the network became pure store-and-forward routers that no longer had to 
keep track of what happened to packets after transmission.  
A closer analysis of the decision not to implement reliability in the core 
reveals a decisionmaking process that is somewhat more complex. Assigning 
responsibility for reliability to the core of the network would have meant 
that nodes had to track packets already transmitted until the next down-
stream router confirmed receipt. If a node failed, the only way the network 
could have recovered from such a loss would have been to restart the entire 
session from scratch.235 
More importantly for our purposes, the decision to assign responsibility 
for maintaining reliability to the hosts was the result of a pragmatic 
tradeoff. Saltzer, Reed, and Clark explicitly recognized that “it would be too 
simplistic to conclude that the lower levels should play no part in obtaining 
reliability” and that “the amount of effort to put into reliability measures 
within the data communication system is seen to be an engineering tradeoff 
based on performance, rather than a requirement for correctness.”236 
Indeed, they recognized that some networks may be so unreliable as to 
justify giving the lower layers greater responsibility for ensuring reliability.237 
The advent of wireless broadband may represent an example of when it 
may make sense to shift responsibility for ensuring reliability to a lower 
layer. Unlike wireline networks, which rarely drop packets for reasons other 
than congestion, wireless networks suffer from much higher loss rates 
 
233 See id. at 284-85 (citing real-time voice conversations as an example of an application 
with a high tolerance for damaged packets but a low tolerance for delay). As David Clark 
observed, 
[T]he most serious source of delay in networks is the mechanism to provide reliable 
delivery. A typical reliable transport protocol responds to a missing packet by requesting 
a retransmission and delaying the delivery of any subsequent packets until the lost 
packet has been retransmitted. It then delivers that packet and all remaining ones in 
sequence. The delay while this occurs can be many times the round trip delivery 
time of the net, and may completely disrupt the speech reassembly algorithm. In 
contrast, it is very easy to cope with an occasional missing packet.  
Clark, supra note 144, at 109. 
234 Cerf & Kahn, supra note 135, at 643. 
235 See Clark, supra note 144, at 107-08. 
236 Saltzer et al., supra note 121, at 280-81. 
237 See id. at 281 (acknowledging that, at times, “[p]erforming a function at a low level may 
be more efficient, if the function can be performed with a minimum perturbation of the machinery 
already included in the low-level subsystem”). 
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caused by the sensitivity of spectrum-based transmission to local condi-
tions.238 Recovering from packet loss can be quite slow, as the process must 
wait for a sending host’s retransmission timer to expire. Moreover, sending 
the duplicate packet from the host necessarily consumes additional network 
resources. 
For this reason, modern wireless broadband networks increasingly de-
ploy network-based reliability systems, such as Automatic Repeat reQuest 
(ARQ), that allow the data-link layer to access information associated with 
the transport layer in order to improve error recovery. Under ARQ, the 
data-link layer uses acknowledgments between adjacent switches to achieve 
faster recovery from errors.239 In addition, the data-link layer installs an 
entity known as a snoop agent that sniffs all packets heading toward the 
receiver to determine whether they are using TCP. If the snoop agent 
receives the data-link layer acknowledgment, it generates its own TCP 
acknowledgment and drops the TCP acknowledgment generated by the 
receiving host.240  
Shifting functions currently performed by the transport layer into either 
the data-link layer or routers operating in the core (and allowing the data-
link layer to observe information associated with the transport layer) 
diverges from the TCP/IP reference model. These proposals have been 
controversial, principally because deviating from the layered model introduces 
variation, which increases the number of interdependencies that each layer 
must take into account.241 For example, there are reports that additional 
latency introduced by ARQ is exacerbating problems with bufferbloat.242 
Experiments allowing lower layers to access information associated with 
higher layers in order to improve network performance are part of the 
burgeoning literature on cross-layer design in wireless networks.243 The 
engineering community has yet to reach consensus on the merits of cross-
layer design. That said, the pragmatic nature of network engineering 
 
238 Yoo, supra note 198, at 77-80. 
239 For a detailed explanation of ARQ, see Dzmitry Kliazovich & Fabrizio Granelli, A Cross-
Layer Scheme for TCP Performance Improvement in Wireless LANs, 2004 PROC. IEEE GLOBAL 
TELECOMM. CONF. 840, 841. 
240 Id. 
241 Kawadia & Kumar, supra note 34, at 7-8.  
242 For more discussion of bufferbloat, see generally Mark Allman, Comments on Bufferbloat, 
43 COMPUTER COMM. REV. 31 (2013); and Jim Gettys & Kathleen Nichols, Bufferbloat: Dark 
Buffers in the Internet, 55 COMM. ACM 57 (2012). 
243 For surveys of this literature, see Fotis Foukalas et al., Cross-Layer Design Proposals for 
Wireless Mobile Networks: A Survey and Taxonomy, 10 IEEE COMM. SURVS. & TUTORIALS 70 
(2008); Sanjay Shakkottai et al., Cross-Layer Design for Wireless Networks, IEEE COMM., Oct. 2003, 
at 74; Vineet Srivastava & Mehul Motani, Cross-Layer Design: A Survey and the Road Ahead, IEEE 
COMM., Dec. 2005, at 112.  
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counsels against basing objections on rigid adherence to a fundamentalist 
principle.244 A better policy would be to understand how the determinants 
of layering may change and to develop heuristic guides to determine when a 
change in the underlying tradeoffs may justify a shift to a different layered 
architecture. 
B. Congestion 
Congestion management represents another interesting case study of 
how the protocol architects allocated a particular function to particular 
layers. The ARPANET placed primary responsibility for congestion 
management on the IMP connected to the receiving host, which used 
RFNMs as a form of flow control to ensure that it did not receive more 
packets than it could handle.245 
The Internet’s initial design similarly followed a core-based approach, 
having routers send ICMP source quench messages to hosts when they 
became congested,246 but that method proved to be ineffective.247 Adopting 
a strikingly different approach, the Internet manages congestion by assigning 
primary responsibility to the sending host. The principles articulated by 
Saltzer, Reed, and Clark, which note that functions should be implemented 
where necessary information resides,248 suggest that the sending host is a 
problematic locus for managing congestion. Congestion is typically the 
product of what multiple hosts are doing, but individual hosts generally 
possess information about only their own activities and lack information 
about the behavior of other hosts. The nodes in the core of the network are 
better positioned to observe the flows being generated by multiple users.249 
 
244 See The Rise of the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on the Evolution of the 
Internet Architecture 8, 10 (IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 3724, J. Kempf & R. Austen 
eds., 2004) [hereinafter RFC 3724], available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc3724 (contending that 
insistence on a fundamentalist principle is “an unproductive approach”). 
245 See supra Section I.A. 
246 See J. Postel, Internet Control Message Protocol: DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specification 
10-11 (IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 792, 1981), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/ 
rfc792.pdf (explaining ICMP source quench messages); RFC 1122, supra note 116, at 103 (requiring 
hosts to react to these messages). 
247 Fernando Gont, Deprecation of ICMP Source Quench Messages 3 (IETF Network Working 
Grp. RFC No. 6633, 2012), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc6633.pdf. 
248 See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
249 See Sally Floyd & Van Jacobson, Random Early Detection Gateways for Congestion Avoid-
ance, 1 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS NETWORKING 397, 397 (1993) (“The most effective detection 
of congestion can occur in the gateway itself.”); see also Handley, supra note 169, at 120 (“Conges-
tion is essentially a network-level problem rather than a transport-level problem . . . .”). 
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Thus, the same information-requirements rationale that suggested that 
reliability should be managed from the edge of the network now suggests 
that congestion should be managed by the core. Since congestion manage-
ment is arguably a service required by a broad range of applications and 
since it requires information that is available only in the core, a core-based 
solution seems most appropriate.250 
The decision to deviate from the logical locus for congestion manage-
ment is best understood in light of the sense of urgency during the mid-
1980s, when the decision to manage congestion from the edge was made. In 
one of the few instances in which network engineers did not stay ahead of 
major problems, the network “suffered from a series of congestion collaps-
es.”251 Any network-based solution would have required modifying all of the 
network’s core routers, which would have taken a long time and been 
prohibitively expensive.252 
Host-based congestion management depends on hosts’ exponentially 
ramping down the amount of traffic they are transmitting whenever the 
network becomes congested. Without a direct congestion signal, however, 
hosts needed some basis for inferring from the signals that were visible to 
them when the network was congested. Van Jacobson and Mike Karels 
devised an ingenious solution to this problem that required adding only a 
few lines of code to the next release of UNIX.253 They noted that networks 
typically drop packets for only two reasons: either the packet becomes 
corrupted or it encounters a congested buffer that was full.254 Because 
wireline networks rarely corrupt packets, hosts could take the failure to 
receive an acknowledgment within the expected amount of time as a de 
facto signal that the network was congested and as an indication that they 
needed to reduce the amount of traffic they were sending through the 
network.255 
 
250 Indeed, Raj Jain proposed a core-based solution that would have enabled routers to notify 
hosts about congestion at the time the edge-based solution was adopted. RAJ JAIN ET AL., 
DIGITAL EQUIP. CORP., CONGESTION AVOIDANCE IN COMPUTER NETWORKS WITH A 
CONNECTIONLESS NETWORK LAYER 6-7 (1997), available at http://www1.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/ 
papers/ftp/cr5.pdf (describing a scheme in which “[a]ll routers in the subnet monitor their load”). 
251 Handley, supra note 169, at 120. 
252 See Van Jacobson, Congestion Avoidance and Control, COMPUTER COMM. REV., Aug. 
1988, at 314, 319 (noting that a network-based solution would “require[] a . . . modification to all 
existing gateways”).  
253 Id. at 314-15, 321. 
254 Id. at 319. 
255 Id. 
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This regime was deployed relatively quickly and has served as the pri-
mary mechanism for managing congestion on the Internet ever since.256 
Assigning responsibility for congestion management to the hosts also made 
the network more flexible by eliminating the need to knit together different 
approaches to congestion management employed by heterogeneous net-
works. Although subsequent mechanisms have been developed to enlarge 
the core’s role in managing congestion, such as Random Early Discard 
(RED) and Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN),257 these mechanisms 
are designed around the scheme devised by Jacobson and Karels. Thus, they 
are effectively supplements to, rather than replacements for, host-based 
congestion management. 
This host-based approach was never intended to be a permanent solu-
tion.258 As an initial matter, because it depended on an inference from the 
lack of an acknowledgment, it worked only for traffic based on TCP.259 The 
advent of latency-sensitive applications, such as streaming video and VoIP, 
has placed increasing emphasis on UDP. The increase in the proportion of 
traffic that does not use acknowledgments has pressured developers and 
computer scientists to find a better solution.260 Some scholars have proposed 
requiring that all UDP implementations be “TCP friendly,” consuming the 
same amount of bandwidth as a typical TCP-based communication.261 Thus 
 
256 TANENBAUM, supra note 4, at 547. 
257 For more on RED, see Bob Braden et al., Recommendations on Queue Management and 
Congestion Avoidance in the Internet 2-3, 7-8 (IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 2309, 1998), 
available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc2309.pdf. For more on ECN, see K. Ramakrishnan et al., 
The Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP 3, 10-13 (IETF Network Working Grp. 
RFC No. 3168, 2001), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc3168.pdf. Interestingly, problems 
with bufferbloat strengthen the use case for deploying RED. For a detailed discussion, see Gettys 
& Nichols, supra note 242, at 59-63. 
258 See Jacobson, supra note 252, at 322 (envisioning host-based congestion recovery as an 
intermediate step toward gateway-based congestion detection). 
259 Handley, supra note 169, at 120. 
260 See KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 4, at 213 (calling UDP’s lack of congestion control “con-
troversial” because its failure to reduce its rate in response to packet loss can cause UDP traffic to 
“crowd[] out . . . TCP sessions”). Kurose and Rose also note that 
[f]rom the perspective of TCP, the multimedia applications running over UDP are 
not being fair—they do not cooperate with the other connections nor adjust their 
transmission rates appropriately. Because TCP congestion control will decrease its 
transmission rate in the face of increasing congestion (loss), while UDP sources need 
not, it is possible for UDP sources to crowd out TCP traffic.  
Id. at 293. 
261 E.g., Sally Floyd et al., Equation-Based Congestion Control for Unicast Applications, 30 COM-
PUTER COMM. REV. 43, 43 (2000); E. Kohler et al., Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) 
6 (IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 4340, 2006), available at http://tools.ietf.org/ 
pdf/rfc4340; Jamshid Mahdavi & Sally Floyd, TCP-Friendly Unicast Rate-Based Flow Control 
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the analytical coherence of TCP-friendly solutions has been subject to 
increasing analytical attack.262  
The growing popularity of streaming video and other UDP-based appli-
cations may also be making the need for core-based congestion management 
more important. When email and web browsing were the dominant forms 
of Internet traffic, one could plausibly argue that variation in applications’ 
ability to tolerate congestion militated against incorporating congestion 
management into lower layers of the protocol stack. The growth of latency-
sensitive applications as a proportion of network traffic has increased the 
justification for returning to a core-based approach to congestion control. 
Of course, network owners can also reduce congestion by increasing capacity. 
Whether increasing capacity or returning to a core-based approach is the 
more efficient solution is largely a matter of relative cost.263 
The growing importance of wireless broadband technologies is also in-
creasing the pressure on the status quo. Unlike wireline networks, wireless 
networks often drop packets for reasons other than congestion, such as 
when atmospheric conditions or reflections create a dead spot that limits the 
amount of bandwidth available or when a bad handoff between cell sites 
leads to a dropped transmission.264 Thus, the advent of wireless broadband 
further undercuts the inference upon which the current system of congestion 
management is based. Also, unlike in wireline systems, which can simply 
increase raw capacity, the limited amounts of spectrum available for wireless 
broadband restrict bandwidth expansion to measures such as reducing cell 
size, and these measures are ultimately limited by Shannon’s Law.265 
 
( Jan. 1997) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.psc.edu/index.php/component/ 
remository/Networking/Networking-Papers/TCP-Friendly-Unicast-Rate-Based-Flow-Control. 
262 See Bob Briscoe, Flow Rate Fairness: Dismantling a Religion, COMPUTER COMM. REV., 
Apr. 2007, at 63, 65 (“Flow rate fairness was the goal behind fair resource allocation in widely 
deployed protocols like . . . TCP-friendly rate control. But it is actually just unsubstantiated 
dogma to say that equal flow rates are fair.” (endnotes omitted)); id. (“To be realistic for large-
scale Internet deployment, relative flow rates should be the outcome of another fairness mecha-
nism, not the mechanism itself. That other mechanism should share out the ‘cost’ of one user’s 
actions on others . . . .”); Jacobson, supra note 252, at 322 (cautioning that while TCP “algo-
rithms at the transport endpoints can insure the network capacity isn’t exceeded, they cannot 
insure fair sharing of that capacity”); M. Mathis, Rethinking TCP Friendly 5 (IETF Congestion 
Control Research Grp. Internet-Draft, Mar. 2009) (unpublished draft), available at http://tools. 
ietf.org/pdf/draft-mathis-iccrg-unfriendly-00.pdf (questioning the assumptions made by the TCP-
friendly model). 
263 See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 227, at 22-23. 
264 See Yoo, supra note 198, at 79 (noting that transmission errors, such as those involving 
interference problems, are frequent within wireless networks). 
265 Shannon’s Law holds that “the maximum rate with which information can be transmitted 
given limited bandwidth is a function of the signal-to-noise ratio.” Id. at 78; see also Claude F. 
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Moreover, the solutions to managing congestion on wireless networks 
often deviate from the established layered architecture.266 Some solutions 
employ a split TCP connection in which the sending host receives an 
acknowledgment from the wireless base station rather than the receiving 
host.267 Others employ a snoop module solution in the base station (much 
like ARQ) that sniffs TCP packets as they pass by, sets a shorter re-
transmission timer than TCP, and then retransmits the packet if it does not 
receive a quick acknowledgment (making sure to discard any duplicated 
acknowledgments).268  
C. Distributed Optimization 
As noted earlier, one of the virtues of protocol layering is that it renders 
each layer largely independent of the others. This allows any entity operat-
ing at one layer to optimize its behavior without considering the impact on 
the overall system.269  
Enabling distributed optimization provides all of the advantages dis-
cussed above,270 but it is not without its drawbacks.271 There is no guarantee 
that individual optimization decisions will necessarily lead to a globally 
optimal solution.272 A few examples will demonstrate this point. 
1. Aggressive TCP Implementations 
Leading network engineers have long recognized that because no one 
feels responsible for thinking broadly about the Internet, actors have 
incentives to act in ways that promote their selfish best interests without 
regard to their impact on the overall system.273 One classic case is aggressive 
TCP implementations. 
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a. Refusal to Back Off in the Face of Congestion 
The host-based approach to managing congestion in the current layered 
architecture means that this regime depends on what amounts to the honor 
system.274 To avoid congestion collapse, Jacobson’s algorithm requires every 
host that detects network congestion to reduce exponentially the number of 
unacknowledged packets it permits to remain outstanding.275 The lack of 
any effective governance mechanism gives rise to a classic cartel cheating 
problem; each host has the incentive to continue to send at a high rate and 
to depend on others to eliminate congestion by reducing their sending 
rates.276 Although the Internet community may once have represented the 
type of close-knit community that could prevent such deviations from 
occurring, the rapid expansion of the Internet has undercut its ability to rely 
on social norms to protect against this type of behavior.277 
b. Multiple TCP Sessions 
Network engineers have also long recognized that a host can obtain a 
larger proportion of the available bandwidth simply by opening multiple 
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point where there is effectively no congestion avoidance and the Internet is chronically congest-
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TCP connections.278 The engineering community attempted to deter such 
behavior by recommending that hosts open no more than two simultaneous 
TCP connections,279 but the lack of enforcement mechanisms meant that 
compliance depended entirely on the honor system. The problem with this 
approach is that it is individually rational for each host to deviate from the 
collectively rational solution.280  
Browser manufacturers began defecting from this restriction in an at-
tempt to obtain better performance than their rivals. The first was 
Netscape, which permitted hosts to open as many as eight TCP connections 
in order to download information in parallel.281 Other new entrants, such as 
Mozilla Firefox, Opera, and Apple Safari, also configured their browsers to 
permit hosts to open eight connections.282 Google’s Chrome browser and 
 
278 This problem was suggested in the very first specification of the host-to-host protocol in 
1970. See Carr et al., supra note 106, at 590 (describing the assumption “that a user does not use 
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(IETF Network Working Group RFC No. 2914, 2000), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/ 
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by host TCP implementations”). 
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NOLOGY 3, 12 (Andy Oram ed., 2001). 
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cometdaily.com/2008/03/05/ie8-6-connections-per-host. 
  
2013] Protocol Layering and Internet Policy 1765 
 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 8 browser showed greater restraint, limiting 
hosts to opening six connections.283 In 2009, Firefox upped the ante, re-
configuring its browser to permit hosts to open up to 15 TCP connections.284  
c. Autotuning 
A new form of aggressive flow is associated with a feature commonly 
known as autotuning. Every TCP implementation signals to sending hosts 
the maximum data rate it is willing to accept by identifying in an advertised 
window the available buffer space in every acknowledgment.285 Because the 
field in the TCP header for the advertised window is sixteen bits wide, the 
maximum amount of traffic that the receiving host could acknowledge was 
long thought to be 216 or 65,536 bytes, which equates to a rate of 5.24 Mbps 
in a path with a roundtrip time of 100 milliseconds.286 
Although this size was appropriate for the constraints of the narrowband 
Internet, the carrying capacity of modern broadband networks has rendered 
this limitation obsolete. Modern TCP implementations have used auto-
tuning to overcome this limitation without deviating from the semantics of 
IP.287 TCP implementations that apply autotuning can use a new feature to 
increase the size of the advertised window by a factor of 214 (more than 
sixteen thousand times larger). With that capacity, the receiver can advertise 
windows of more than 1 billion bytes,288 which can increase throughput 
rates on a path with a roundtrip time of 100 milliseconds to increase trans-
mission rates to over 85 Gbps. 
Long built into Linux and Apple O/S, autotuning has now been incor-
porated into Windows Vista and Windows 7.289 TCP implementations that 
lack autotuning capabilities will unilaterally constrain the amount of traffic 
sent to the size of the available buffer advertised by the receiver, which is 
limited to 65,535 bytes without autotuning.  
 
283 Id.; see Alsciende, Answer to Max Parallel http Connections in a Browser?, STACKOVER-
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2009), http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=12066. 
285 COMER, supra note 4, at 198; Walter Willinger & John Doyle, Robustness and the Inter-
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Grp. RFC No. 1323, 1992) [hereinafter RFC 1323], available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc1323. 
288 Id. at 11. 
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Autotuning raises two basic problems. First, previous TCP implementa-
tions naturally constrained bandwidth usage by not allowing more than 65 
thousand bytes per session to be in transit. Implementations running 
autotuning are much less constrained. To the extent that this transmission 
rate exceeds the carrying capacity of the network, new implementations will 
increase their sending rates until they create congestion somewhere in the 
network. Second, to the extent that implementations with and without 
autotuning operate on the same network, the newer implementations will 
consume a disproportionate amount of the bandwidth,290 providing another 
example of interactions between the transport and the data-link layers. 
Curbing these opportunistic behaviors may require a network-based 
solution operating in the lower layers that identifies and limits the behavior 
of aggressive transport protocols. Leading examples include Weighted Fair 
Queuing (WFQ)291 and flow-valve mechanisms such as the RED “penalty 
box.”292 To the extent that these solutions require the inspection of 
transport layer data and penalizing certain transport layer implementations, 
they are inconsistent with protocol layering. 
2. Simultaneous Optimization 
Another classic problem arises when two different layers attempt to op-
timize the same parameter. The fact that both layers attempt to make 
adjustments at the same time will interfere with the feedback that each is 
receiving. This is precisely the concern that is the focus of the longstanding 
literature critical of layering.293 
 
290 See Geoff Huston, A Decade in the Life of the Internet, INTERNET PROTOCOL J., June 
2008, at 7, 13; Video, Changing Technology and the Limits of the Layered and End-to-End Models, CTR. 
FOR TECH., INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, U. PA. L. SCH. (May 6, 2010), https://www.law. 
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machines running Windows XP. Until I disabled the autotuning feature on the new machine, its 
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On some level, the recent dispute between Comcast and BitTorrent can 
be understood through this lens.294 BitTorrent attempts to maximize 
throughput by opening up hundreds of TCP connections and searching for 
the five with the fastest links.295 Comcast, for its part, initially attempted to 
manage congestion by targeting the hosts’ transport layers by sending TCP 
resets.296 Comcast’s current implementation operates exclusively at the 
data-link layer, detecting when portions of the network are congested and 
temporarily slowing down the traffic from the heaviest users that are 
creating the congestion.297 As a result, both the data-link and the transport 
layers may both adjust flows simultaneously to optimize throughput. 
Moreover, layering permits BitTorrent to focus solely on optimizing its 
own operations, which may or may not coincide with the outcome Comcast 
was pursuing or the global optimum. 
Network engineers have begun to use unified theories of distributed 
optimization to evaluate the performance of the existing Internet. They 
have concluded that the existing system of layers is only one of several 
possible solutions to the problem and have used the distributed optimiza-
tion framework to identify cross-layer structures that may perform better.298 
These solutions, however, necessarily diverge from the layered architecture 
by making information visible to other layers that would otherwise remain 
hidden. 
3. Other Considerations 
The net result is that the emergence of wireless broadband, the growing 
importance of UDP-based applications, and attempts by upper layers to 
avoid interdependencies are putting pressure on the existing layered 
architecture. Waiting in the wings are new applications such as cloud 
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computing that may demand different functionality and may require a 
remodularization of the layered stack.299 
D. Security 
Another development pressuring the layered model is the growing need 
for security. Although IP datagrams include a source IP address in their 
header, that information is not reliable and can easily be forged.300 Although 
solutions to this problem exist, they have not yet been widely deployed.301 
Moreover, the TCP/IP Reference Model does not allow end users to verify 
the paths along which a particular communication has traveled. Although 
verification was less problematic when the Internet remained a close-knit 
community, the growth in the size and heterogeneity of end users is placing 
increasing emphasis on the importance of trust.302 
Although network-based features such Internet Protocol Security (IP-
Sec) and Domain Name System Security (DNSSec) exist, security and 
identity verification have been regarded primarily as the responsibility of 
the hosts.303 More recently, responsibility for some security-related func-
tions has begun shifting to third-party proxies operating in the network’s 
core rather than the host.304 The shift of these functions into the network’s 
core is consistent with the principle of locating particular functions where 
the information needed to perform those functions resides.305 Accurate 
spam detection, for example, often requires the ability to examine email 
destined for many different users. Modern approaches to botnet detection 
often examine the DNS queries being submitted by a large number of hosts 
 
299 For a discussion of cloud computing, see Yoo, supra note 198, at 83-86. 
300 See David Moore et al., Inferring Internet Denial-of-Service Activity, 24 ACM TRANSAC-
TIONS COMPUTER SYS. 115, 118 (2006) (noting that “many attackers forge, or ‘spoof,’ the IP 
source address of each packet they send”). 
301 J. Touch et al., Problem and Applicability Statement for Better-than-Nothing Security (BTNS) 
7 (IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 5387, 2008), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc5387. 
302 See YOO, supra note 32, at 17 (“[T]he universe of end users has become less trustworthy, 
as reflected by the increased frequency of spam, viruses, invasions of privacy, and other forms of 
malicious behavior.”); Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the Design of the 
Internet: The End-to-End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, 1 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON 
INTERNET TECH. 70, 75-76 (2001) (describing the breakdown in trust on the Internet); RFC 
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to identify the bot master.306 Increased reliance on third-party proxies stems 
from the fact that many end users no longer trust their own machines. In 
what computer scientists Marjory Blumenthal and David Clark call “the 
ultimate insult,” these end users may trust a third-party proxy residing in 
the network more than they trust the computer sitting on their desk.307 
These considerations have increasingly led end users to look to network-
based solutions to provide security.308 Many of these security implementations 
violate the principles of protocol layering. Firewalls are core-based technol-
ogies that examine transport-layer information—such as port numbers—to 
determine which information to filter.309 Spam detection often requires that 
the middlebox operating in the network layer pass beyond the transport 
layer to examine email at the application layer in order to detect spam. In 
addition, major ISPs routinely sample the traffic passing through their 
network and use deep packet inspection (DPI) to examine it for security 
threats.310 Each of these practices represents a violation of the layering 
principle prohibiting devices in the network’s core from examining infor-
mation associated with the transport or application layers. 
In addition to its security benefits, DPI can also enhance a network’s 
functionality. For example, Plusnet uses DPI to divide the data stream into 
multiple levels of priority.311 Prioritizing traffic in this manner has enabled 
Plusnet to win numerous industry awards for the quality of its network 
connections and for customer satisfaction.312 Despite these benefits, however, 
using DPI to examine content in the core of the network represents a clear 
violation of layering. 
Most radically, the National Science Foundation’s Future Internet 
Architecture initiative places greater emphasis on designing architectures in 
which identity and path verification are inherent properties of the layered 
stack rather than a feature added after the fact.313 A good example of this 
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limitation is network security. The current architecture does not permit 
verifiable information about the identity of particular end users to pass 
through the protocol stack.314 Despite the growing need for security caused 
by the increasing size of the Internet and its utilization for increasingly 
delicate tasks, the network has been slow to adapt to this new reality. The 
shifting importance of these concerns emphasizes the importance of not 
regarding any particular layered architecture as if it were a natural con-
struct. Moreover, it underscores the potential dangers of using regulation to 
enshrine any particular architecture into law. 
CONCLUSION 
Layering has emerged as a popular way to analyze emerging issues of 
Internet policy. In addition to providing a more integrated and functionally 
oriented alternative to the approach enshrined in the Communications Act 
of 1934, under which each mode of transmission is treated as a regulatory 
universe unto itself, layering conforms to the manner in which the engi-
neering community views the network. Layering also plays a key role in 
making the complexities of network management more tractable. Indeed, it 
is hard to see how one would solve such a complex engineering problem as 
the Internet without it. 
Policymakers should not forget the engineering literature that analyzes 
circumstances under which layering can lead to suboptimal outcomes. 
Although layering is designed to facilitate interconnection and promote 
innovation by modularizing clusters of tasks and thus making them inde-
pendent, it comes at a cost of reduced functionality and efficiency. More-
over, like all forms of modularity, layering works by information hiding and 
by minimizing the extent to which interdependencies cross module bounda-
ries. As such, any set of layered protocols reflects a preexisting vision of 
how layers should interact and which interdependencies matter. Changes in 
the technology and environment surrounding the Internet are putting new 
pressures on those commitments. Rather than mandating access to the exis-
ting interfaces or opposing practices that deviate from the existing architec-
ture, policymakers should adopt a more dynamic perspective that allows for 
the possibility that the optimal layered structure may change over time. 
The dynamic way that the layered model evolved also underscores that 
network engineering is an inherently pragmatic enterprise that is ill suited 
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to broad, categorical generalizations or claims of inviolability. Indeed, no 
idealized architecture is inherently superior.315 The optimal architecture 
depends instead on the shape of the particular flows passing through the 
network, on the value that end users place on particular services, and on the 
relative costs of network resources. The advent of Internet-based video, 
wireless broadband, new architectural features, and security-related con-
cerns transforms the technological and economic environment surrounding 
the Internet. This transformation creates natural pressure on the layered 
stack to evolve in response. 
As of now, those participating in policy debates do not have a working 
understanding of many fundamental principles around which the Internet is 
organized. For example, policymakers would benefit from having a basic 
grasp of how congestion is managed on the Internet, which areas the 
engineering community regards as settled, and which are regarded as 
controversial. Debates over controversial engineering principles are often 
heated, as is the case in any academic discipline; as a result, debates about 
layering at times engender strong assertions of diametrically opposed views. 
Sensible Internet policy depends on the participants in policy debates 
having a sufficient appreciation of the issues and positions in these debates 
to take the full range of views presented in the engineering literature into 
account. 
 
315 RFC 817, supra note 5, at 2 (“[T]here may be no such thing as a successful general purpose 
protocol implementation.”). 
